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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of selected state and 
federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law from the year 2005.  They are neither 
comprehensive in breadth (several cases are omitted) nor in depth (many issues within 
individual cases are omitted).  Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an 
authoritative guide; rather, they are intended to alert the Alaska legal community about 
judicial decisions from the previous year.  The summaries are grouped by subject matter. 
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II.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
Ninth Circuit 
 
Yakutat, Inc. v. Gutierrez 
In Yakutat, Inc. v. Gutierrez,1 the Ninth Circuit held that a regulation setting 
qualifying years for the purpose of awarding fishing licenses was neither arbitrary nor 
capricious and was supported by a rational basis.2  Yakutat challenged the licensing 
program of the National Marine Fisheries Service in district court on the grounds that 
exclusion of 1999 as a qualifying year was unfair, inequitable, and lacked a rational 
basis.3  The district court granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment, and 
Yakutat appealed.4  The Ninth Circuit held that because the Secretary based the 
regulation on various reports and public comments, it was not arbitrary or capricious.5  
Further, the Secretary’s decision to place a higher premium on historical participation 
when limiting entry of newer fishing vessels was a rational basis for the regulation.6  The 
Ninth Circuit held that a National Marine Fisheries Service regulation that sets qualifying 
years for the purpose of awarding fishing licenses was valid because it was neither 
arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by a rational basis.7   
 
 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Forest Service 
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Forest Service,8 the Ninth Circuit 
held that the U.S. Forest Service’s adoption of a logging plan based on an error in market 
demand projection was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”)9 and misleading and inadequate in violation of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)10.11  In revising the land management plan for a 
forest, the Forest Service misinterpreted market demand projections for timber.12  As a 
result, the Forest Service included in its Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) a 
projection that was nearly double the true number and adopted a logging plan using these 
incorrect numbers.13  The Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) challenged the 
                                                
1 407 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2005). 
2 Id. at 1057. 
3 Id. at 1066. 
4 Id.  
5 Id. at 1067–68. 
6 Id. at 1073. 
7 Id. at 1057. 
8 421 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2005). 
9 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). 
10 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000). 
11 Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 F.3d at 816. 
12 Id. at 802. 
13 Id. at 801–02. 
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plan as arbitrary and capricious and the EIS as misleading and inadequate.14  The district 
court held for the Forest Service, concluding that the error was insignificant, and NRDC 
appealed.15  The Ninth Circuit held that the Forest Service’s adoption of the plan was an 
arbitrary and capricious action in violation of the APA because the plan’s adoption ran 
counter to the evidence and the Forest Service failed to show that the mistake was a 
harmless error.16  The Ninth Circuit also held that the EIS violated NEPA by misleading 
the public about the economic effects of the plan,17 failing to consider alternatives based 
on correct market demand projections when the Forest Service was aware of the error,18 
and inadequately assessing the cumulative impact of past and reasonably foreseeable 
future non-federal logging.19  The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the 
Forest Service’s projection error rendered its plan arbitrary and capricious in violation of 
the APA and its EIS misleading and inadequate in violation of NEPA.20 
 
 
Alaska Department of Health & Social Services v. Centers For Medicare & Medicaid 
Services 
In Alaska Department of Health & Social Services v. Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services,21 the Ninth Circuit held that the Administrator of the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) acted permissibly in denying the State of 
Alaska’s proposed amendment to alter federal reimbursement rates to Indian tribal health 
facilities.22  The State petitioned for judicial review on the grounds that the decision was 
arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.23  The Ninth Circuit 
found that an agency rule is arbitrary and capricious if it relies on factors which Congress 
did not intend it to consider, fails to consider important aspects of the problem, acts 
inconsistently with the evidence before it, or is entirely implausible given agency 
expertise.24  Here, the court held that CMS did not act arbitrarily or capriciously because 
the agency denied the State’s proposal on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the 
statutory requirement of efficiency, economy, and quality of care and it failed to comply 
with statutory upper payment limit regulations.25  Thus, the court denied judicial review 
of the CMS Administrator’s final judgment denying the program amendments.26 
 
 
                                                
14 Id. at 800. 
15 Id. at 804. 
16 Id. at 806–7. 
17 Id. at 813. 
18 Id. at 814. 
19 Id. at 814–16. 
20 Id. at 816–17. 
21 424 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2005). 
22 Id. at 934. 
23 Id.  
24 Id. at 938. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 944. 
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Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Grunert v. Alaska 
In Grunert v. Alaska,27 the supreme court invalidated a regulation that created a 
cooperative fishery and allocated a quota of salmon to the fishery.28  Grunert, a 
fisherman, challenged the regulation, claiming that it exceeded the authority of the 
Alaska Board of Fishery, conflicted with the statutory definition of “fishery,” was 
inconsistent with the act’s purpose and policy, and was unconstitutional.29  The superior 
court granted the State's motion for summary judgment upholding the validity and 
constitutionality of the regulation, and Grunert appealed.30  The supreme court held that 
the regulation was invalid because it transformed the limited entry permit from a personal 
gear license into an ownership share in the cooperative fishery.31  The supreme court 
further held that the regulation contradicted the statutory definition of "fishery" by 
allocating the same resources to both a cooperative and an open fishery using the same 
type of gear in the same area.32  The supreme court reversed the superior court's grant of 
summary judgment, finding the regulation creating a cooperative fishery invalid, and 
remanded the case.33     
 
 
Vroman v. City of Soldotna  
In Vroman v. City of Soldotna,34 the supreme court held that the de facto officer 
doctrine can confer validity on an improperly selected arbitrator when the arbitration is 
part of a municipal grievance procedure and not a collective bargaining agreement.35  
After Vroman was fired from the police department, he requested arbitration of his 
grievance regarding the termination.36  Due to the unavailability of one of the original 
arbitrators, the mayor selected an alternate arbitrator but failed to get city counsel 
confirmation, as required by municipal code.37  Vroman challenged the arbitration based 
on the procedural defect but the superior court denied the challenge.38  Vroman 
appealed.39  The supreme court held that Vroman did not waive his right to challenge the 
alternative arbitrator’s participation because he did not have a knowing intent to 
relinquish a right or privilege when he failed to object to the arbitrator’s presence during 
                                                
27 109 P.3d 924 (Alaska 2005). 
28 Id. at 926. 
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 928. 
31 Id. at 936. 
32 Id. at 930–31. 
33 Id. at 936. 
34 111 P.3d 343 (Alaska 2005). 
35 Id. at 348–49. 
36 Id. at 345. 
37 Id. at 346. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
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arbitration.40  However, the supreme court held that the de facto officer doctrine — which 
confers validity on acts by officers with defects in their title — barred Vroman from 
arguing the arbitrator’s participation because the alternate had colorable authority due to 
his appointment by the mayor.41  Moreover, the court held there was no indication that 
the original arbitration was unfair, and the arbitration was conducted on a municipal code 
provision and therefore did not violate private contract law.42  
 
 
Fuller v. City of Homer 
In Fuller v. City of Homer,43 the supreme court held that a city is permitted to 
charge a fee for producing public documents but not for conducting a privilege review of 
the documents.44  Fuller requested documents concerning an annexation of land from the 
City of Homer.45  The city charged Fuller a fee for the production including time spent by 
the city manager for a privilege review.46  Fuller appealed the superior court's granting of 
summary judgment to the city and its dismissal of her complaint.47  She claimed error in 
the determination that the city was entitled to charge a fee for the privilege review and 
that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the time spent on the review 
and the amount charged for it.48  The supreme court held that under relevant state statutes 
and city code provisions, the city was entitled to charge a fee for ministerial tasks related 
to the production of public records but that privilege review was not such a task and 
therefore could not be included in the fee determination.49  The supreme court reversed 
the order of summary judgment and remanded for recalculation of the appropriate fee.50 
 
 
Carlson  v. Renkes 
In Carlson v. Renkes,51 the supreme court held that: 1) when an administrative 
agency issues a final decision, it must give notice of the 30-day appeal period52 and 2) 
that the loss of an administrative record alone was not a violation of due process.53  After 
an administrative hearing, the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) transferred Carlson, a 
prisoner, to Arizona.54  Carlson objected and filed a pro se complaint in the superior court 
                                                
40 Id. at 347 n.9. 
41 Id. at 347–48. 
42 Id. at 348–49. 
43 113 P.3d 659 (Alaska 2005). 
44 Id. at 660. 
45 Id. at 660–61. 
46 Id. at 661. 
47 Id. at 662. 
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 668. 
51 113 P.3d 638 (Alaska 2005). 
52 Id. at 642. 
53 Id. at 643.   
54 Id. at 639–40.   
 6 
claiming due process violations and requesting a reparative injunction.55  The superior 
court granted the State’s motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim, holding that 
Carlson was required to bring his claim as an administrative appeal, not a civil action, 
and that he lost the ability to do so because the thirty-day appeal period had passed.56  
Carlson appealed, arguing that the court erred in characterizing his complaint as an 
administrative appeal and that the loss of an audio tape of his hearing was a violation of 
due process.57  The supreme court held the superior court’s treatment of the complaints as 
an administrative action was not in error because the statute Carlson sued under merely 
contained definitions and not a cause of action.58  However, the supreme court found that 
the superior court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint because the DOC did 
not notify Carlson of his thirty-day limit for appeal.59  Although the supreme court held 
that the loss of the hearing’s audio tape was not a violation of due process, it ordered that 
the superior court try to recreate Carlson’s administrative record on remand.60  The 
supreme court vacated the order dismissing Carlson’s claim on the grounds that he was 
not properly notified of his thirty-day time limit and remanded with the stipulation that 
the superior court recreate his administrative record.61 
 
Conkey v. State of Alaska, Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles 
In Conkey v. State of Alaska, Department of Administration, Division of Motor 
Vehicles,62 the supreme court held that riding a towed snowmobile with limited steering 
ability constitutes operating a motor vehicle under Alaska law.63  Conkey was arrested for 
driving while intoxicated while riding on a towed snowmobile.64  The departmental 
hearing officer found by a preponderance of the evidence that there was probable cause to 
arrest Conkey for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and 
imposed a three-year revocation of Conkey’s driver’s license.65  After the superior court 
affirmed the departmental officer’s findings, Conkey appealed, claiming that a 
snowmobile was not legally a motor vehicle and, in addition, he was not operating it 
when he was arrested. 66  The supreme court affirmed the departmental and superior 
court’s rulings that a towed snowmobile is a motor vehicle and Conkey’s limited steering 
of the towed snowmobile involved exercising control over the vehicle, which constitutes 
operating the vehicle.67  
 
                                                
55 Id. at 640.   
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 641–42.   
58 Id. at 641.   
59 Id. at 642.   
60 Id. at 642–43.   
61 Id. at 641–43.   
62 113 P.3d 1235 (Alaska 2005). 
63 Id. at 1236. 
64 Id. at 1236–37. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1237–39. 
67 Id. at 1238–39. 
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State, Department of Health & Social Services v. Valley Hospital Ass’n, Inc. 
 In State, Department of Health & Social Services v. Valley Hospital Ass’n, Inc.,68 
the supreme court found that a state agency’s determination of rates owed by a hospital 
was arbitrary and capricious.69  The Alaska Department of Health and Social Services 
(“DHSS”), retroactively and without prior notice, enacted a deadline for the submission 
of information to be used in setting Medicaid reimbursement rates.70  Even though DHSS 
had an accurate report of Valley Hospital’s Medicaid costs, the department refused to 
accept the report under the new deadline rule and instead relied on cost information that it 
knew to be inaccurate.71  The superior court found the rate set by DHSS to be improper.72  
The supreme court affirmed, finding that DHSS’s reasons for using the erroneous data, in 
these circumstances, were so insubstantial as to constitute an abuse of discretion.73  The 
court also found that DHSS should be left to determine a reasonable way to re-calculate 
the rate on its own.74 
 
 
George Easley Co. v. Estate of John Lindekugel 
In George Easley Co. v. Estate of John Lindekugel,75 the supreme court held that 
the Alaska Worker's Compensation Board did not err in finding a company liable for an 
employee's injuries under the last injurious exposure rule and denying the company's 
requests for offsets to the award.76  John Lindekugel suffered a work-related injury in 
1976 that resulted in a permanent disability classification.77  In 1981, after being cleared 
to work, Lindekugel suffered another work-related injury while employed by the George 
Easley Co.78  The Worker's Compensation Board found Easley liable under the last 
injurious exposure rule which required that: (1) the employment related to the second 
injury aggravated or accelerated the first injury and (2) the employment was a legal cause 
or substantial factor in the disability.79  The board also denied Easley's petitions to offset 
the award based on Lindekugel's social security benefits, his settlement with his first 
employer, and his legal malpractice settlement.80  The superior court affirmed the board's 
findings, and Easley appealed.81  The supreme court held that in workers’ compensation 
cases, there is a presumption of compensability when the employee has presented some 
                                                
68 116 P.3d 580 (Alaska 2005). 
69 Id. at 581. 
70 Id. at 582. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 581. 
73 Id. at 587. 
74 Id. 
75 117 P.3d 734 (Alaska 2005). 
76 Id. at 736. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 737. 
79 Id. at 739. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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evidence that work related activities could have aggravated or caused the employee's 
injuries.82  To rebut that presumption, Easley would have to show that the injury was not 
caused by activities related to Lindekugel’s work at Easley or that there was no 
possibility of the employment causing the disability.83  The supreme court held that the 
medical evidence presented by Easley was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
compensability.84  The supreme court also held that Easley was not entitled to offsets 
relating to the earlier employment and legal malpractice settlements because they were 
related to questions of law and not of fact.85  The supreme court further held that while 
the offset relating to social security benefits did involve a question of fact, the Worker's 
Compensation Board did not abuse its discretion in deciding Easley was not entitled to 
the offset.86  The supreme court affirmed the decisions of the superior court and the 
Worker's Compensation Board holding that Easley was liable under the last injurious 
exposure rule and that it was not entitled to offsets due to the previous employment and 
legal malpractice settlements or the social security payments.87 
 
 
Laidlaw Transit, Inc. v. Anchorage School District 
In Laidlaw Transit, Inc. v. Anchorage School District,88 the supreme court held 
that a transportation company’s action against a school district and another transportation 
company was properly treated as an administrative appeal;89 that the district’s 
proceedings complied with due process;90 and that there was a reasonable basis for 
finding that it was in the school district’s best interest to award the transportation contract 
to another company.91  Laidlaw Transit and First Student, transportation companies, bid 
on a contract with Anchorage School District.92  After First Student offered to match 
Laidlaw’s low proposal, the school district held a hearing to determine which 
transportation company would be in the district’s best interests.93  When the district chose 
to give the contract to First Student, Laidlaw sued, alleging fraud and miscalculation.94  
The trial court converted this civil action to an administrative appeal and affirmed the 
board’s decision.95  Laidlaw appealed.96  The supreme court held that Laidlaw’s action 
was properly characterized as an administrative appeal since it was a challenge to the 
                                                
82 Id. at 740. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 742. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 744–45. 
87 Id. at 745. 
88 118 P.3d 1018 (Alaska 2005). 
89 Id. at 1024–25. 
90 Id. at 1029. 
91 Id. at 1038. 
92 Id. at 1021.  
93 Id. at 1021. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
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board’s decision.97  Moreover, the court held that Laidlaw’s due process rights were not 
violated because the board hearing was not meant to resolve competing property interests 
and the board was not required to hear unlimited testimony or grant cross-examinations.98  
Finally, the court held that the board’s determination of best interest was reasonable 
because there was substantial evidence supporting the decision and the board had 
extensive discretion to award or not award the contract to any bidder.99  Thus, the 
supreme court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.100 
 
 
Lindhag v. State, Department of Natural Resources 
In Lindhag v. State, Department of Natural Resources,101 the supreme court held 
that the Alaska Worker’s Compensation Board’s (“the Board’s”) denial of benefits to an 
employee was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the employee’s petition for modification.102  Lindhag quit her job 
after her personal doctor advised her that the building she worked in was either 
exacerbating or causing a medical condition.103  The Board agreed to pay Lindhag 
benefits for some symptoms but not for others, based largely on the findings of a Board-
appointed physician.104  After acquiring new evidence about her condition, Lindhag filed 
a petition for reconsideration, which the Board denied.105  The supreme court upheld the 
Board’s decision to deny benefits because the Board’s determination was supported by 
substantial evidence.106  The court specifically found the Board, which had the sole 
power to determine witness credibility, had properly accorded more weight to the 
findings of the Board-appointed physician than Lindhag’s personal physician.107  Further, 
the court held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Lindhag’s petition for 
rehearing and modification because the post-hearing evidence was presented without due 
diligence108 and failed to offer any evidence of a change in her condition.109  The supreme 
court thus affirmed the superior court’s decision to uphold the Board’s orders, holding 
that the partial denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence and that the 
denial of the petition for rehearing was not in error.110 
 
 
                                                
97 Id. at 1024–25. 
98 Id. at 1029. 
99 Id. at 1038. 
100 Id. at 1039. 
101 123 P.3d 948 (Alaska 2005). 
102 Id. at 950. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 951. 
105 Id. at 952. 
106 Id. at 954. 
107 Id. at 953–54. 
108 Id. at 957. 
109 Id. at 958. 
110 Id. 
 10 
 
III.  BUSINESS LAW 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Brown v. Dick 
In Brown v. Dick,111 the supreme court held that inadvertent violations of 
proxy disclosure requirements resulting from good-faith reliance on expert advice did 
not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty and did not per se require an award of 
nominal damages.112  A group of dissident shareholders led by Brown complained of 
proxy violations in voting related to a controversial land transaction.113  A consent 
decree entered by the Alaska Department of Community and Economic 
Development’s Division of Banking, Securities, and Corporations, confirmed that 
certain alleged proxy violations did occur but were inadvertent.114  Brown claimed 
that the violations amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty and that he was entitled to 
nominal damages.115  The superior court found no breach of fiduciary duty because 
the violations were based on good-faith reliance on expert advice and denied nominal 
damages.116   The supreme court held that the superior court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying nominal damages where the violations were inadvertent and 
based on good-faith reliance on expert advice.117  
 
 
Harris v. Ahtna, Inc. 
In Harris v. Ahtna, Inc.,118 the supreme court held that a buy-or-sell contract 
between two shareholders did not comply with a shareholder agreement requiring such 
contracts to state an equal monetary price.119  Under a shareholder agreement between 
Harris and Ahtna Inc. (“Ahtna”), each party could make a special offer to sell, forcing the 
other shareholder to either buy the offeror’s shares at the offered price or sell his own 
shares at the same price.120  Ahtna made such an offer, providing a price per share as well 
as two other conditions, which required assumption of debt.121  Harris agreed only to the 
price term, claiming that the debt assumption conditions were invalid under the 
agreement.122  Ahtna claimed that this response obligated Harris to sell his shares.123  The 
                                                
111 107 P.3d 260 (Alaska 2005). 
112 Id. at 261. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 262. 
115 Id.  
116 Id. at 263. 
117 Id. at 266–67. 
118 107 P.3d 271 (Alaska 2005). 
119 Id. at 275. 
120 Id. at 272–73. 
121 Id. at 273. 
122 Id. 
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superior court issued a partial final judgment requiring Harris to sell his shares to 
Ahtna.124  Harris appealed, arguing that the two assumption of debt terms violated the 
shareholder agreement because they constituted non-monetary price conditions that 
created price inequality depending on which shareholder was the seller, and that he was 
entitled to specific performance to buy the shares based on the price term agreement.125  
The supreme court held that the buy-or-sell contract could not contain non-monetary 
conditions and that there must be price equality regardless of who buys or sells.126  
However, Harris’ acceptance of the price term alone did not create an enforceable 
contract allowing specific performance because Ahtna’s offer was merely conditional.127  
The supreme court reversed the partial final judgment and remanded the case, holding 
that the buy-or-sell contract violated the agreement’s requirement of equal price and 
preclusion of non-monetary conditions and that Harris was not entitled to specific 
performance.128 
 
 
Deaver v. Auction Block Co. 
In Deaver v. Auction Block Co.,129 the supreme court held that a fish auctioneer 
who issued a fisherman a fish ticket was the primary fish buyer.130  Deaver, a commercial 
fisherman, received a fish ticket from Auction Block in return for his catch.131  The ticket 
listed Auction Block as the buyer and specified the price of the catch, but Auction Block 
paid Deaver less than the specified price.132  Deaver filed suit for breach of contract and 
the superior court dismissed his claims, finding that Auction Block was merely an 
auctioneer and not a buyer.133  The supreme court held that because Auction Block issued 
its own fish ticket to Deaver, it was the buyer of the fish.134  The court reasoned that a 
primary fish buyer who is the initial recipient of fish cannot avoid its statutory duty under 
state law to post surety bond to secure payment to fishers simply because it had a 
contractual duty to act as an auctioneer.135  Also, because Auction Block accepted the fish 
within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code, it was contractually bound to pay 
Deaver the specified amount.136  The supreme court reversed and remanded the case for 
                                                                                                                                            
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 274. 
125 Id. at 275. 
126 Id. at 276. 
127 Id. at 279. 
128 Id. at 275, 279. 
129 107 P.3d 884 (Alaska 2005). 
130 Id. at 892. 
131 Id. at 886. 
132 Id. at 886–87. 
133 Id. at 887. 
134 Id. at 892. 
135 Id. at 889–90. 
136 Id. at 891–92. 
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further proceedings on Deaver’s breach of contract claim, holding that Auction Block 
was the primary fish buyer.137 
 
 
Hall v. TWS, Inc. 
In Hall v. TWS, Inc.,138 the supreme court held that a creditor could foreclose on 
its interest in a business venture because it was not a tenancy in partnership.139  Hall and 
Moore purchased a mining operation together.140  Hall subsequently filed for 
bankruptcy.141  After that, Moore’s interest was assigned to TWS, and TWS moved to 
foreclose on its interest.142  The supreme court held that, although a partnership was 
formed, the subsequent bankruptcy dissolved the partnership, making the mining 
operation a tenancy in common.143  Moreover, no new partnership agreement was formed 
after the bankruptcy.144  Thus, the supreme court held that the business venture was a 
tenancy in common rather than a tenancy in partnership and TWS could foreclose on its 
interest.145  
 
 
OK Lumber Co. v. Alaska Railroad Corp. 
 In OK Lumber Co. v. Alaska Railroad Corp.146, the supreme court held that an 
arbitrator’s ruling on the fair market value of land was within the scope of arbitration.147  
OK Lumber leased land from the Alaska Railroad Corporation with the rent tied to the 
fair market value of the property.148  The parties agreed to arbitrate disputes as to the fair 
market value of the property. 149  OK Lumber argued that the arbitrator exceeded his 
authority when he added a factor to the determination of fair market value that was not in 
the contract.150  The supreme court held that the language of the contract allowed the 
arbitrator to arbitrate any disagreement over fair market value and further held that 
arbitrators’ findings of facts are unreviewable, even in the case of gross error.151  The 
supreme court therefore affirmed the superior court’s decision to uphold the arbitrator’s 
determination.152 
                                                
137 Id. at 892. 
138 113 P.3d 1207 (Alaska 2005). 
139 Id. at 1213–14. 
140 Id. at 1208. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 1212. 
144 Id. at 1214. 
145 Id. 
146 123 P.3d 1076 (Alaska 2005). 
147 Id. at 1077. 
148 Id.  
149 Id.  
150 Id. at 1078. 
151 Id. at 1078–79. 
152 Id. at 1081. 
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IV.  CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Catalina Yachts v. Pierce 
In Catalina Yachts v. Pierce,153 the supreme court held that a sailboat seller was 
entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs incurred when its pre-trial settlement offer was 
rejected and the jury returned a judgment less favorable to the offeree.154  The Pierces 
bought a new sailboat from Catalina Yachts and sued when Catalina refused to replace 
the damaged hull under the warranty.155  While the jury found in favor of the Pierces, the 
total of the jury award plus attorneys’ fees and costs was less than Catalina’s pre-trial 
offer, which the Pierces had rejected.156  Catalina then filed a motion for post-offer fees 
under Alaska Civil Rule 68.157  The superior court denied this motion and a motion for 
reconsideration, holding that Rule 68 did not apply because it was preempted by federal 
law.158  Catalina appealed.159  The supreme court held that the Rule 68 requirement that 
an offeree pay attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by the offeror when the offeree receives 
a judgment that is less favorable than the pre-trial offer is mandatory and is not 
conditioned on any other rule.160  In addition, the court held that Rule 68 is not in conflict 
with the federal law and does not hinder its purpose.161  The supreme court reversed and 
remanded the case to determine the fees and costs to which Catalina was entitled.162 
 
 
Morgan v. Fortis Benefits Insurance Co.  
In Morgan v. Fortis Benefits Insurance Co.,163 the supreme court held that the 
trial court properly granted summary judgment for an insurer on the basis that a 
decedent’s death fell under her policy’s intoxication exclusion.164  The decedent was 
driving with a blood alcohol level well above the legal limit, when her car ran off the 
road causing her death.165  The insurer, Fortis, claimed that the decedent’s death fell 
under the policy’s intoxication exclusion, because the death was caused either directly or 
                                                
153 105 P.3d 125 (Alaska 2005). 
154 Id. at 131. 
155 Id. at 126–27. 
156 Id. at 127 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 127–28. 
159 Id. at 128. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 128–29. 
162 Id. at 131. 
163 107 P.3d 267 (Alaska 2005). 
164 Id. at 268. 
165 Id. 
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indirectly by the decedent’s intoxication.166  The trial court granted summary judgment 
for Fortis.167  On appeal, the supreme court held that summary judgment was properly 
granted because the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence 
was that the decedent’s accident and death were at least indirectly caused by her 
intoxication.168  The supreme court applied the standard of construing grants of insurance 
coverage broadly, and exclusions narrowly, in favor of the insured.169  Thus, the supreme 
court affirmed the superior court, holding that the policy’s intoxication exclusion 
applied.170 
 
 
Phillips v. Gieringer 
In Phillips v. Gieringer,171 the supreme court held that notice of a complaint and 
knowledge of a mistake made on a complaint may be imputed to a defendant through the 
defendant’s insurance company.172  Phillips filed a suit against Carl Gieringer after the 
two were involved in an automobile accident but mistakenly identified Carl’s father, 
Robert Gieringer, as the defendant.173  Phillips amended the complaint to properly 
identify Carl as the defendant after the statute of limitations had run, prompting the 
superior court to dismiss the complaint. 174  The supreme court held that because Carl and 
Robert shared the same insurance plan and Phillips had sent the insurance company a 
copy of the complaint, there was a presumption that notice was imputed to Carl.175  
Moreover, the supreme court held that the insurance company knew or should have 
known that Phillips meant to identify Carl as the defendant.176  Thus, the supreme court 
reversed the superior court’s dismissal of the complaint.177 
 
 
Kaiser v. Umialik Insurance 
In Kaiser v. Umialik Insurance,178 the supreme court held that improperly asserted 
equitable estoppel and equitable tolling arguments do not remedy a claim filed after the 
statute of limitations had run.179  On appeal from the denial of a bad faith claim against an 
insurer, Kaiser claimed that equitable estoppel or equitable tolling allowed him to file a 
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claim after the statute of limitations had run.180  In affirming the lower court’s ruling, the 
supreme court held that Kaiser had waived his claim to equitable estoppel because he did 
not raise the issue in the superior court181 and dismissed the claim of equitable tolling 
because Kaiser did not undergo any extraordinary circumstances that would justify the 
claim.182   
 
 
DeNardo v. Calista Corp. 
In DeNardo v. Calista Corp.,183 the supreme court held that where a stipulated 
dismissal preserved a plaintiff’s claims, neither res judicata nor the doctrine against claim 
splitting barred a subsequent action.184  DeNardo filed lawsuits in state and federal court 
against Calista based on the same facts.185  The state court lawsuit was removed to federal 
court and consolidated with the federal court lawsuit.186  The state claims were then 
remanded and subsequently voluntarily dismissed by the parties.187  The federal court 
then dismissed the federal court claims.188  DeNardo then filed a third lawsuit in superior 
court based on the same facts as alleged in the first state lawsuit.189  The superior court 
dismissed the claims, relying on res judicata and the doctrine against claim splitting, and 
DeNardo appealed.190  The supreme court held that res judicata based on stipulated 
dismissal does not bar causes of actions expressly reserved for future adjudication.191  
Here, the dismissal of the state claims alleged to be with prejudice were actually without 
prejudice because they expressly preserved all claims pending in federal court (which 
were included in the state lawsuit).192  The court also found that the federal court 
dismissal did not rule on the merits of the non-federal claims and therefore did not 
preclude claims brought in the third lawsuit.193  The claim splitting argument was also 
rejected because the third lawsuit raised only claims that were brought up in the first state 
action.194  Therefore, the court vacated the order dismissing the complaint and remanded 
the case, holding that the claims in DeNardo’s third lawsuit were not barred.195 
 
                                                
180 Id. at 880.   
181 Id. at 881. 
182 Id. at 881–82. 
183 111 P.3d 326 (Alaska 2005). 
184 Id. at 328. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 329. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 332. 
192 Id. at 333–34. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 335. 
195 Id. 
 16 
 
Monzingo v. Alaska Air Group 
In Monzingo v. Alaska Air Group,196 the supreme court held that a non-prevailing 
plaintiff filing a class-action suit is not liable for attorneys’ fees solely related to class 
certification and notice.197  Monzingo sued Alaska Airlines based on an individual claim 
and elected to be the named plaintiff in a class action claim.198  The supreme court held 
that a non-prevailing plaintiff should only pay attorneys’ fees related to the individual 
merits of his or her own claim and not fees related to a class action.199  The court further 
held that allowing the threat of additional liability for attorneys’ fees would hamper the 
policy behind Rule 82 by discouraging plaintiffs from acting as class representatives.200  
Thus, the policy behind Rule 82 does not support imposing attorneys’ fees on a named 
plaintiff when those fees involve class action preparation that falls outside the substantive 
merits of the plaintiff’s individual case.201  Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the 
superior court’s grant of summary judgment but vacated the fee award and remanded for 
a determination of the appropriate award.202 
 
 
Rockstad v. Erikson  
In Rockstad v. Erikson,203 the supreme court upheld the trial court’s summary 
judgment decisions and its decisions on damages but vacated an award of attorneys’ fees 
and costs incurred in litigation outside the province of the state court.204  A jury found 
Rockstad liable for failure to repay a loan that was secured by a note and a deed of trust 
on his home.205  Rockstad appealed the superior court’s ruling on his statute of limitations 
and usury defenses,206 its decision to allow judicial foreclosure of his house, and its 
award of attorneys’ fees.207  The supreme court held that there is no mandatory obligation 
to grant summary judgment even when such a motion is unopposed because undisputed 
facts could oppose the motion.208  The court also held that the statue of limitations 
determination could not be appealed because Rockstad introduced evidence during trial 
that defeated his statute of limitations claim.209  With respect to the superior court’s 
ruling on Rockstad’s usury defense, the supreme court held that there was no violation of 
the usury statute because the plain language of the loan note indicated that there was only 
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one loan for $26,000, which is above the $25,000 limit established in the statute.210  
Considering the five factors of quasi-estoppel, the court concluded that judicial 
foreclosure was appropriate because the doctrine of quasi-estoppel applied to enforce the 
deed of trust.211  Finally, the court held that the trial court’s award to Erikson of full 
attorneys’ fees was appropriate because it was pursuant to the terms of the note and 
deed.212  However, the award cannot include attorneys’ fees incurred in Rockstad’s 
bankruptcy litigation because it was outside the province of the state court and solely in 
the power of the federal bankruptcy court to make such an award.213  
 
 
In the Matter of Kristine A. Schmidt 
In In the Matter of Kristine A. Schmidt,214 the supreme court held that an order 
assessing attorneys’ fees and costs may be upheld where it explains the basis for the 
sanction, even if it does not cite a violation of a specific rule in the Alaska Rules of Civil 
Procedure.215  The superior court issued an order granting Schmidt’s motion to accept a 
late-filed brief and directing her to pay attorneys’ fees for the opposing party’s reply brief 
and then issued a subsequent order again denying the motion and ordering her to pay 
additional attorneys’ fees.216  Schmidt appealed, arguing that the superior court must 
specify a violation of a Rule of Civil Procedure before awarding attorneys’ fees.217  
Moreover, she argued that she did not violate any Rule, and that she did not receive 
notice before being fined for the late brief.218  The supreme court held that an order 
assessing attorney’s fees may be upheld even if it does not cite a Rule of Civil Procedure 
violated if the basis for the sanction is still discernible from the order.219  Moreover, 
Schmidt violated Rules that require litigants to follow court-set deadlines, and any notice 
deficiency was cured by her opportunity to move for reconsideration.220  However, the 
supreme court held that the superior court abused its discretion in issuing the second 
order because it did not explain its change in course from the first order.221  The supreme 
court thus affirmed the superior court’s first order and vacated the second, holding that an 
order assessing attorneys’ fees and costs may be upheld where it explains the basis for the 
sanction.222 
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Crumpler v. State  
In Crumpler v. State,223 the supreme court held that modification of a  child 
support obligation should be retroactive to the date a parent was served with the 
modification.224  When notice of modification of child support sent to Crumpler was 
returned as undeliverable, the Child Support Enforcement Division resent the notice to 
Crumpler’s new address. 225  The superior court held that a state civil rule requires such 
orders to be effective as of the filing date of the motion.226  On appeal, the supreme court 
affirmed the modification of child support,227  holding that the superior court did not 
abuse its discretion, that Crumpler was properly served notice, and he had further an 
obligation to notify the court of his change of address.228   
 
 
Wendell C. II v. State of Alaska, OCS 
In Wendell C. II v. State of Alaska, OCS,229 the supreme court held that a superior 
court decision may be upheld even if the superior court improperly considered evidence 
if there was no reasonable likelihood that exclusion of the evidence would have affected 
the decision.230  The superior court terminated plaintiffs’ parental rights, citing extra-
record social science studies in making two of its findings.231  Plaintiffs appealed, arguing 
that the superior court improperly considered evidence outside of the record.232  The 
supreme court held that there was no reasonable likelihood that the decision to terminate 
plaintiff’s parental rights would have been different without the studies, because other 
admissible evidence was sufficient to establish the two challenged findings.233  The 
supreme court thus affirmed the termination of parental rights, holding that a superior 
court decision may be upheld despite improper consideration of evidence if there was no 
reasonable likelihood that the decision would have been different without the 
consideration.234 
 
 
Hymes v. Deramus 
In Hymes v. Deramus,235 the supreme court held that the superior court 
improperly denied a continuance in a lawsuit against medical personnel associated with 
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the prison system.236  Hymes and his wife sued medical personnel associated with the 
Alaska Department of Corrections.237  The defendants moved for summary judgment, and 
the superior court issued an order stating that if the couple did not submit “an expert 
affidavit” supporting their position, summary judgment would be granted.238  The 
Hymeses later requested a continuance, which was denied, and the defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment was granted.239  On appeal, the supreme court reversed the 
summary judgment, holding that the Hymeses met the three requirements to receive a 
continuance: (1) they unambiguously requested relief; (2) they were not dilatory during 
discovery; and (3) they adequately demonstrated why extra time was needed.240   
 
 
Owen M. v. State 
In Owen M. v. State,241 the supreme court affirmed the denial of an evidentiary 
hearing when an appeal was filed after the statute of limitations on the claim had run.242  
The superior court terminated Owen M.’s parental rights and declined to place the child 
with a family member other than Owen M.’s parents.243  Owen M. appealed, and he 
argued that the court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing and by not placing the 
child with his parents.244  The supreme court affirmed the superior court, finding that an 
evidentiary hearing was not required because it was not required by the statute covering 
parental termination proceedings.245  Moreover, it held that because Owen M.’s appeal of 
his child’s placement was filed after the statute of limitations had run, it was invalid.246   
 
 
Snyder v. American Legion Spenard Post No. 28  
In Snyder v. American Legion Spenard Post No. 28,247 the supreme court affirmed 
the superior court’s grant of summary judgment based on discovery sanctions imposed as 
a result of the appellant’s failure to appear at trial.248  The superior court imposed 
discovery sanctions, leading to summary judgment.249  Snyder appealed both the grant of 
summary judgment motion and denial of motion for relief, arguing that (1) he was denied 
due process by the imposition of litigation ending sanctions and (2) his failure to appear 
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at trial was excusable neglect due to lack of service and pro se ineptitude.250  The 
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s holding that an appellate court may affirm a 
judgment on any ground supported by the record whether or not it was relied upon by the 
trial court and that here summary judgment can be grounded on Snyder’s non-appearance 
at trial.251  The supreme court also affirmed the denial of Snyder’s motion for relief 
because Snyder was not denied due process and did not show excusable neglect.252   
 
 
Marron  v. Stromstad 
In Marron  v. Stromstad,253 the supreme court held that the superior court did not 
abuse its discretion regarding a series of discovery, evidentiary, and procedural 
decisions.254  Stromstad rear-ended Marron’s car, and Marron sued Stromstad for 
negligence.255  The jury found for Stromstad, and Marron appealed several evidentiary 
and procedural decisions.256  Marron first challenged the admission of the testimony of 
three experts for failing to meet the federal Daubert standard.257  The supreme court 
declined to extend the Daubert analysis to non-scientific expert testimony and rejected 
Marron’s argument.258  Specifically, the court held that a treating physician testifying 
about the course of treatment used is not subject to the Daubert analysis.259  Marron also 
challenged the admission of one of the physicians because of failure to provide an expert 
report.260  The supreme court held that treating physicians need not be listed as experts 
and therefore their testimony was admissible without the expert disclosure 
requirement.261  In addition, Marron challenged the superior court’s denial of her motion 
for a new trial.262  The supreme court held that a party requesting a new trial has the 
burden of proving both error and prejudice, and neither occurred in this case.263  Finally, 
the supreme court held that the superior court improperly awarded attorneys’ fees to a 
party who has not itemized his or her fees, when such itemization was requested by the 
opposing party.264  The supreme court affirmed all superior court decisions except the 
award of attorneys’ fees, which it remanded.265  
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Gilbert v. Sperbeck 
In Gilbert v. Sperbeck,266 the supreme court held that a psychologist could not be 
sued for fraud and misrepresentation during arbitration testimony.267  Further, he had 
witness immunity, and thus could not be sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”).268  During arbitration regarding an automobile accident in which Gilbert was 
involved, Sperbeck, the insurance company’s psychologist, testified that a personality 
disorder caused Gilbert to over-report her pain.269  The arbitrator ruled against Gilbert 
and she filed suit against Sperbeck, claiming he was fraudulent, misrepresented her 
injuries, and violated the ADA by not providing her with an appropriate chair during their 
interview.270  The superior court granted Sperbeck’s motion for summary judgment and 
Gilbert appealed.271  The supreme court held that Gilbert’s claims of fraud and 
misrepresentation were barred because public policy extends witness immunity to 
arbitration proceedings.272  The court also held that the ADA could not provide the relief 
sought because Title III only allows monetary damages if the United States Attorney 
General requests them, which he had not.273  Finally, the court held that Gilbert waived 
any statutory claims by failing to cite authority or advance a legal theory on which to 
base such claims.274  The supreme court therefore affirmed the judgment of the superior 
court entering summary judgment against Gilbert.275 
 
 
Sengupta v. Wickwire 
In Sengupta v. Wickwire,276 the supreme court held that an attorney was not liable 
for malpractice.277  Wickwire represented Sengupta, a professor at the University of 
Alaska at Fairbanks, who was terminated for cause.278  After the superior court affirmed 
the termination, Wickwire agreed to appeal only the issue of whether Sengupta was 
entitled to a hearing before faculty prior to termination, and the appeal was denied 
because it was filed late.279  Sengupta then sued the University for various violations of 
his constitutional rights and lost in both the superior and supreme courts.280  He then sued 
Wickwire for malpractice for (1) failing to raise a First Amendment claim of retaliation 
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for exercising the right to free speech at the grievance hearings and (2) filing the untimely 
appeal.281  The superior court granted summary judgment for Wickwire, which Sengupta 
appealed.282  The supreme court held: (1) Wickwire could not have raised the First 
Amendment claim at the grievance hearings since Sengupta had not been terminated at 
that time, and (2) Sengupta was not injured by the untimely appeal because Wickwire 
agreed to limit the scope of the appeal to only one issue, on which Sengupta could not 
have prevailed as it was subsequently decided against him by the supreme court.283  The 
supreme court thus affirmed the superior court’s order granting summary judgment to 
Wickwire.284 
 
 
 
Cikan v. Arco Alaska, Inc. 
 In Cikan v. Arco Alaska, Inc.,285 the supreme court held that a woman had 
presented enough evidence of her own incompetence to prevent dismissing her action as 
time-barred.286  Cikan slipped and fell outside of ARCO’s offices and suffered a 
concussion.287  Following her injury, Cikan did not file a suit against ARCO until after 
the statute of limitations had expired.288  The superior court granted ARCO summary 
judgment on the ground that Cikan’s claim was time barred due to the expiration of the 
statute of limitations and lack of persuasive evidence indicating incompetence.289  The 
supreme court noted Cikan had presented more than a “scintilla” of evidence of her 
incompetence,290 which justified an evidentiary hearing by the superior court to resolve 
ARCO’s statute of limitations defense.291  The supreme court reversed the superior 
court’s ruling and remanded the case for review.292 
 
 
John v. Baker 
In John v. Baker,293 the supreme court held that tribal courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction with state courts regarding Alaska Natives child custody issues, but tribal 
courts do not have jurisdiction over child support determinations.294  John and Baker, 
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both Alaska Natives, separated and later disagreed on the custody of their children.295  
Baker petitioned for custody in tribal court, which awarded shared custody and told the 
parties not to seek child support.296  Dissatisfied, Baker filed a new custody and child 
support petition with the superior court.297  John challenged, claiming that the tribal court 
had jurisdiction and had decided the custody and child support issues.298  After a series of 
jurisdictional disputes, the superior court concluded that tribal courts lack subject matter 
jurisdiction over child support.299  The supreme court held that the child support and child 
custody matters were separate.300  Since the superior court had jurisdiction over child 
support, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision that the division has 
authority to enforce the superior court’s child support order.301 
 
 
Polar Supply Co. v. Steelmaster Industries 
In Polar Supply Co. v. Steelmaster Industries,302 the supreme court held that 
Alaska courts had personal jurisdiction over a Canadian supplier because the supplier had 
sufficient minimum contacts under Alaska’s long arm statute and jurisdiction comported 
with fair play and substantial justice.303  Steelmaster Industries, a Canadian company, 
entered into a contract with Polar Supply Co., knowing that it was an Alaska corporation 
and that it planned to use the equipment in Alaska.304  When Polar sued Steelmaster in 
superior court, Steelmaster argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction, and the 
superior court agreed.305  The supreme court held that the superior court did have 
personal jurisdiction because Steelmaster had sufficient minimal contacts with Alaska, as 
evidenced by the fact that it knowingly and directly negotiated and dealt with an Alaska 
corporation.306  Moreover, Steelmaster could have reasonably anticipated a possible 
lawsuit in Alaska,307 and the inconvenience to Steelmaster was minimal, so exercise of 
jurisdiction comported with fair play and substantial justice.308  Thus, the supreme court 
reversed the superior court’s order dismissing the case because Alaska courts could 
exercise personal jurisdiction over Steelmaster.309 
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V.  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW  
 
 
Ninth Circuit  
 
United States v. Combs 
In United States v. Combs,310 the Ninth Circuit held that police officers who did 
not physically knock on a door before executing a search warrant acted reasonably and 
thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment.311  When the police executed a search 
warrant on Combs’ house, they saw smoke and flames indicating methamphetamine 
cooking.312  After thirty to sixty seconds, during which the police announced themselves 
over a public address system, they entered the house without knocking.313  Combs was 
convicted of various drug-related crimes and he appealed, arguing evidence from the 
house should have been suppressed because the police failed to knock on his door before 
entering.314  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that although officers generally should “knock 
and announce,” their method of entry is part of a “totality of the circumstances” 
reasonableness inquiry, in which a literal knock is not always required.315  Because the 
police announced their presence to the extent possible here, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
Combs’ conviction, holding that the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
because they had acted reasonably in executing the search warrant.316 
 
 
Turney v. Pugh 
In Turney v. Pugh,317 the Ninth Circuit held that Alaska’s jury tampering statute 
did not violate the First Amendment.318  Before jury selection at a criminal trial, Turney 
approached potential jurors and handed them a number to a phone line that encouraged 
jury nullification.319  One juror called the line and then changed his vote, preventing the 
jury from reaching a decision.320  The jury was excused and Turney was indicted for jury 
tampering under Alaska Statute section 11.56.590.321  He was found guilty and his 
conviction was upheld by the supreme court, and he filed a writ of habeas corpus in 
district court, challenging the jury tampering statute on First and Sixth Amendment 
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grounds.322  The district court dismissed the writ, but the Ninth Circuit granted a 
certificate of appealability to determine whether the statute is overbroad.323  The court 
held that section 11.56.590 was not overbroad because its focus is limited to the narrow 
category of communications aimed at improperly influencing the outcome of a specific 
case.324  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that Alaska’s jury 
tampering statute was not overbroad.325 
 
 
United States v. Dorsey 
In United States v. Dorsey,326 the Ninth Circuit upheld a conviction because the 
arrest, search, and trial statements were permissible and because the modern Gun-Free 
School Zones Act327 (“the Act”) is constitutional, but remanded for reconsideration of the 
sentence because the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) are now 
advisory.328  Dorsey was arrested after police stopped him for driving recklessly and 
found cocaine and a handgun in his car.329  He pled guilty to several drug and firearm 
offenses, including a violation of the Act and was sentenced to ninety-eight months 
imprisonment under the Guidelines, which were mandatory at the time.330  He appealed 
his conviction and sentence.331  The Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction because there 
was probable cause for the arrest, the resulting search of Dorsey’s car was proper, and a 
trial statement was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted.332  The Ninth Circuit also held that the Act is constitutional under the 
Commerce Clause because it contains a proper jurisdictional element.333  However, the 
Ninth Circuit held that Dorsey’s sentence was plain error because the Guidelines are no 
longer mandatory.334  The Ninth Circuit affirmed Dorsey’s conviction because his arrest, 
search, and trial were all proper and the Act is constitutional and then remanded for 
reconsideration of the sentence.335 
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Osborne v. District Attorney’s Office 
In Osborne v. District Attorney’s Office,336 the Ninth Circuit held that a §1983 
claim should not have been dismissed because its success did not “necessarily imply” the 
invalidity of the underlying conviction.337  Osborne had been sentenced to prison for 
kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault.338  The District Attorney’s Office denied him 
post-conviction access to biological evidence that he hoped to subject to new methods of 
DNA analysis, and Osborne filed a §1983 action, alleging violations of his federal 
constitutional rights.339  The district court dismissed the claim, ruling that his action 
would impermissibly “set the stage” to invalidate his underlying conviction.340  On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the correct test is whether Osborne’s claim 
“necessarily implies” that his conviction is invalid.341  Applying this test, the court 
concluded that mere access to the DNA evidence does not “necessarily imply” the 
invalidity of Osborne’s underlying conviction.342  The Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court, holding that Osborne’s §1983 action should be allowed to proceed.343 
 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Lawson v. Lawson 
 In Lawson v. Lawson,344 the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of Alaska 
Civil Rule 90.3 because previous evaluation of the rule already established its 
constitutionality.345  At trial, Lee Lawson moved to be excused from paying child support 
to his wife, Valerie, arguing that the “best interests of the child” provisions of Rule 90.3 
were unconstitutional.346  The court denied his motion and Lee appealed.347  The supreme 
court held that Rule 90.3 (1) was neither vague nor overbroad, (2) did not violate equal 
protection, (3) did not violate the Fourth Amendment, (4) did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment, (5) did not violate the Alaska Constitution’s right to privacy, and (6) did not 
violate the doctrine of separation of powers.348  The supreme court thus affirmed the 
superior court’s order on the grounds that Rule 90.3 was constitutional.349 
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State, Division of Elections v. Metcalfe 
In State, Division of Elections v. Metcalfe,350 the supreme court held the 
legislature did not act unreasonably by requiring a political party to receive three percent 
of the vote in the previous gubernatorial election to appear on the ballot or by requiring 
an individual to collect signatures of voters equal to one percent of the voters in the 
previous gubernatorial election to appear on the ballot.351  Metcalfe, a political candidate 
seeking placement on the ballot, was denied ballot access by statute because his political 
party failed to receive three percent in the last gubernatorial election; he also did not 
submit signatures equal to one percent of the voters in the last gubernatorial election.352  
Metcalfe brought suit, claiming violations of the free speech and equal protection 
provisions of the Alaska Constitution353 and received a preliminary injunction from the 
superior court.354  The supreme court reversed,355 holding that Metcalfe failed to establish 
a clear probability of success on the merits.356  The court held the three percent polling 
requirement was not unreasonable, because the figure was in the mainstream of the 
practices of other states.357  Moreover, the court found the heightened requirement for 
continuing ballot access for a party compared to ballot access for an individual is justified 
by the benefits derived from party ballot access.358  Thus, the supreme court found that 
ballot access requirements for both political parties and individuals were not 
unreasonable,359 reversed the superior court’s order, and vacated the preliminary 
injunction.360 
 
 
State v. Trust the People  
In State v. Trust the People,361 the supreme court held that an initiative application 
for a proposed bill belonged on the general election ballot.362  Trust the People, an 
initiative committee, submitted an application for a proposed bill.363  The state lieutenant 
governor denied certification of the initiative based on an opinion by the Department of 
Law which stated such an initiative violated the Seventeenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.364  The superior court held a hearing on the denial of certification, 
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found that certification should have been granted, and ordered the initiative to be 
included on the statewide general election ballot.365  The state appealed, arguing that the 
proposed initiative was void because it was substantially the same as a bill passed in the 
state legislature.366  The supreme court held that the proposed initiative and the bill were 
not “substantially the same” because the two had different purposes.367  Moreover, the 
supreme court held that because the subject matter of the initiative was not “specifically 
barred from the initiative process,” it should have been submitted to voters.368  The 
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision and ordered the lieutenant governor 
to include the initiative on the general election ballot.369 
 
 
Larson v. Cooper 
 In Larson v. Cooper,370 the supreme court affirmed summary judgment dismissing 
an inmate’s constitutional tort claim, holding that the uncontested evidence indicated the 
prison had legitimate reasons to restrict the inmate’s visitation privileges and the inmate 
had failed to offer evidence of retaliatory conduct.371  Larson had his contact-visit 
privileges revoked after he refused to stop holding hands with his wife.372  Larson was 
subsequently found not guilty on the disciplinary charge of disobeying an officer, and he 
appealed to the superior court, alleging the suspension of contact visitation rights was 
done to retaliate against him for holding hands with his wife in furtherance of his 
religious beliefs and for contesting his disciplinary charges.373  To sustain such a charge, 
the court held, Larson had the burden of showing his conduct was constitutionally 
protected and the adverse action was prompted by a retaliatory motive.374  Although the 
court held that pursuing his grievances was a constitutionally protected activity,375 the 
court did not find his acquittal on disciplinary charges dispositive.376  The court upheld 
the dismissal on summary judgment, holding that disobedience of a guard’s direct order, 
a legitimate reason for punishment, was uncontroverted.377   
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State v. Dupier  
In State v. Dupier,378 the supreme court held that the state did not exceed its 
authority in requiring halibut fishers to possess interim-use permits, that federal law did 
not preempt the state’s permit requirements, and that the permit requirements did not 
violate the federal constitution.379  After fishing legally in federal waters while in 
possession of federal permits, Dupier and two other fishers attempted to land their 
catches in Alaska.380  None of the fishers had obtained state permits, nor had they 
attempted to fish in state waters.381  The state prosecuted them for their lack of valid 
interim-use state permits.382  The superior court found the state had encroached upon 
federal law and dismissed the charges.383  The court of appeals affirmed.384  The supreme 
court reversed, finding that interim-use permits were freely available,385 halibut fishery 
management was not the exclusive jurisdiction of federal law,386 and the state’s permit 
requirements did not actually conflict with federal law.387 
 
 
State, Division of Elections v. Green Party of Alaska 
 In State, Division of Elections v. Green Party of Alaska,388 the supreme court held 
that state election law requiring each political party to have its own primary ballot 
violated the Alaska Constitution because it substantially burdened a party’s association 
rights and the state’s justification for imposing the burden was insufficient.389  Under 
Alaska Statute section 15.25.060(a),390 political parties were required to have their own 
ballet containing only their candidates in primary elections.391  The Green Party of Alaska 
and the Moderate Republican Party were accordingly denied the ability to form a joint 
ballot and challenged the law, claiming the law violated their constitutional rights.392  The 
court first determined the parties’ rights had been burdened because the right to decide 
who can participate in selecting its candidates is of central importance to the right of 
association.393  The court further determined this burden was substantial because it did 
not allow parties to appeal to voters unwilling to limit their political choices to one 
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party.394  Finally, the court determined the state’s justifications for the restrictions were 
either too abstract or not narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.395  Therefore, the 
court held the prohibition on combined ballots under section 15.25.060(a) violated the 
Alaska Constitution.396 
 
 
Casciola v. F.S. Air Service, Inc 
In Casciola v. F.S. Air Service, Inc.,397 the supreme court held that an award of 
punitive damages that was ten times more than actual damages did not violate due 
process.398  F.S. Air Service contracted with Casciola for jet engines and paid him a 
deposit.399  Casciola misrepresented his ability to provide jet engines, did not provide the 
engines, and refused to return the deposit.400  F.S. Air Service brought suit, and the 
superior court awarded $30,000 in actual damages and $300,000 in punitive damages.401  
Casciola appealed.402  The supreme court held that the punitive damages award did not 
violate state or federal due process because a large award is necessary to deter this type of 
fraud and because Alaska law gives notice that a high ratio between actual and punitive 
damages was possible for extremely reprehensible conduct.403  The supreme court thus 
held that the punitive damages award did not violate Casciola’s due process rights and 
affirmed the judgment of the superior court.404 
 
 
Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State 
 In Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State,405 the supreme court held that spousal 
limitations in benefits paid to public employees violated the equal protection clause of the 
state constitution as applied to employees with same-sex domestic partners.406  The State 
of Alaska and the Municipality of Anchorage paid benefits to the spouses of public 
employees.407  The Alaska Civil Liberties Union and eighteen individuals filed suit 
claiming the benefits violated equal protection.408  The superior court granted the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.409  The supreme court found on appeal that 
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opposite-sex couples have the opportunity to gain the benefits by marrying while same-
sex couples never have the opportunity to receive the benefits.410  Applying the sliding-
scale analysis, the court held that the benefits program did not meet minimum scrutiny 
because the denial of benefits to same-sex couples is not substantially related to the 
legitimate government interests of cost control, administrative efficiency, and promotion 
of marriage.411  The supreme court vacated the superior court’s judgment, holding that 
the spousal employee benefits program violated equal protection under the state 
constitution.412 
 
 
Alaska Court of Appeals  
 
Anderson v. State 
In Anderson v. State,413 the court of appeals held that the Confrontation Clause of 
the United States Constitution does not bar the admission of an out-of-court statement 
made by an injured person at the scene of a crime.414  An officer responded to a 9-1-1 call 
and found an injured man lying on the ground.415  The officer asked the man what 
happened, and the man responded Anderson had hit him with a pipe.416  At trial, the 
injured man’s statement was presented to the jury through the officer’s hearsay 
testimony.417  The court of appeals ruled that the out-of-court statement did not amount to 
a “testimonial” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.418  Hence, the court of appeals 
affirmed the superior court’s admission of the evidence,419 holding that the injured man’s 
statement was not inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.420 
 
 
Osborne v. State 
In Osborne v. State,421 the court of appeals held that a felon did not establish a 
prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the lower court should 
reconsider its decision on whether to allow further DNA testing.422  Osborne was 
convicted of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault, based in part on a DNA test.423  He 
filed an application for post-conviction relief, claiming his counsel provided ineffective 
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assistance.424  The superior court denied this application, and Osborne appealed.425  The 
court of appeals held that Osborne did not establish a prima facie case of ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his attorney’s tactical decision to use a less discriminating 
test was objectively reasonable.426  The court ruled that state due process required a 
defendant seeking post-conviction DNA testing to meet a three-part test: (1) the 
conviction rested primarily on eyewitness identification evidence, (2) there was a 
demonstrable doubt concerning the defendant’s identification as the perpetrator, and (3) 
scientific testing would likely be conclusive on the issue.427  The court of appeals 
affirmed the ruling that Osborne did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel but 
remanded, directing the superior court to apply the three-part test to determine whether to 
allow further DNA testing.428 
 
 
Milligrock v. State 
In Milligrock v. State,429 the court of appeals held that consideration of three 
aggravating factors at sentencing did not violate a felon’s right to jury trial because two 
were based on his prior convictions and the third was undisputed.430  Milligrock, who had 
two past felony convictions, was convicted of assaulting his girlfriend.431  The superior 
court judge enhanced his sentence based on three aggravating factors.432  Milligrock 
appealed, claiming that the enhanced sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial.433  The court of appeals upheld the judge’s finding of the first two aggravating 
factors because they were expressly exempted as being based on past convictions.434  The 
court upheld the ruling on the last aggravating factor because the evidence was 
undisputed.435  The court of appeals affirmed the sentence, holding that consideration of 
three aggravating factors in sentencing did not violate Milligrock’s right to a jury trial.436 
 
 
Crane v. State  
In Crane v. State,437 the court of appeals held that there is no distinction between 
“counselors at law” and “attorneys” and that Alaska attorneys are validly licensed by the 
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supreme court and the Alaska Bar.438  Defendant Crane asserted that he was being 
deprived of the assistance of counsel because “attorneys” did not qualify as “counsel.”439  
The district court ruled that there was no difference, and Crane appealed, arguing that 
attorneys are not “counsel” for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment and that there have 
been no properly admitted attorneys in Alaska since the legislature withdrew the right of 
the Alaska Bar and supreme court to certify legal practitioners in 1976.440  The court of 
appeals held that modern attorneys are authorized to perform the duties of both 
“attorney” and “counselor” and thus qualify as “counsel.”441  Also, attorneys since 1976 
have been validly licensed because the power to admit practitioners remains with the 
judicial branch, and the 1976 legislature granted the Alaska Bar’s Board of Governors 
authority to certify legal practitioners.442  The court of appeals affirmed the district 
court’s judgment, holding that attorneys qualify as “counsel” and that attorneys are 
properly certified and admitted by the supreme court and the Alaska Bar.443 
 
 
State v. Kalmakoff 
In State v. Kalmakoff,444 the court of appeals held that the Blakely445 rule does not 
apply to the Alaska juvenile waiver procedure.446  Kalmakoff was indicted as an adult 
after the superior court granted the state’s petition to waive juvenile jurisdiction for him 
because he failed to establish in a waiver hearing that he was amenable to treatment as a 
juvenile.447  Kalmakoff moved to return jurisdiction to the juvenile court, arguing that the 
juvenile waiver procedure violates the Blakely rule that any disputed fact that increases 
the penalty of a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be proved to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.448  The superior court granted the motion, and the state petitioned for 
review.449  The court of appeals held that Blakely’s reasoning does not apply to juvenile 
waiver proceedings because they are not sentencing proceedings but determinations of 
jurisdiction.450  The court of appeals reversed the lower court order, holding that the 
Blakely rule does not apply to the Alaska juvenile waiver procedure.451 
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VI.  CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 
Ninth Circuit 
 
United States v. Combs 
In United States v. Combs,452 the Ninth Circuit held that entry into a dwelling to 
execute a search warrant is not a per se Fourth Amendment violation because of a law 
enforcement official’s failure to knock.453  Combs was convicted of manufacturing 
methamphetamines after Anchorage police discovered a production facility in his 
home.454  He appealed on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that evidence should have 
been suppressed because the police failed to knock before entering his house.455  The 
Ninth Circuit held that determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 
requires an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances.456  Since officers had reason to 
be concerned for their safety and because they announced their presence to the extent 
possible under the circumstances, the court held that their actions were reasonable despite 
the absence of an actual knock.457  Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Combs’s 
conviction.458 
 
 
United States v. Cruz 
In United States v. Cruz,459 the Ninth Circuit held United States v. Booker460 does 
not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.461  Cruz was convicted and 
sentenced based on judge-found facts.462  After her sentence was final, she collaterally 
attacked it claiming a Sixth Amendment violation as outlined in Booker.463  The Ninth 
Circuit joined every other circuit in holding that Booker does not meet any Teague464 
exceptions and therefore does not apply retroactively.465  The court affirmed the district 
court’s denial of Cruz’s petition.466 
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United States v. Henry 
In United States v. Henry,467 the Ninth Circuit held that a search of a criminal 
defendant’s property was valid because he did not have control over the property and 
consented to the search; additionally, it held that the defendant’s guilty plea could not be 
retracted post-sentencing.468  Henry was arrested in connection with one crime but was 
cleared.469  Before he was released he wanted to retrieve his belongings from the room 
where he was initially arrested.470  He was not a guest in the room, but he gave 
permission for the search nonetheless.471  Upon searching his belongings, the police 
found drugs, and Henry pled guilty to their possession.472  After being sentenced by the 
district court, Henry appealed, arguing that because the police improperly searched his 
belongings, the drug possession evidence should be excluded and his lawyer thus 
improperly advised him to plead guilty.473  The Ninth Circuit rejected both arguments, 
stating that the search was proper because Henry gave consent for the search and did not 
have a claim to privacy over the room because he was not a guest there.474  It also held 
that Henry’s lawyer did not improperly advise him to plead guilty given the totality of the 
circumstances.475  The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court on these two 
issues but granted a limited remand for Henry to assert Sixth Amendment claims that he 
did not originally raise in the district court.476 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Michael v. State 
In Michael v. State,477 the supreme court held that the de novo standard applies in 
reviewing a superior court’s application of aggravating and mitigating factors to 
particular facts in sentencing.478  After being convicted of first-degree sexual assault, 
Michael tried to establish two statutory mitigating factors, that his conduct was among 
the least serious in the definition of his offense and that the harm he caused was minor.479  
He also argued that a non-statutory mitigating factor, potential for rehabilitation, required 
his sentence to be adjusted by a three-judge panel.480  The superior court rejected the 
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statutory factors, and the court of appeals affirmed under a clearly erroneous standard.481  
The superior court also refused to allow a three-judge panel to review sentencing.482  The 
supreme court held that the de novo standard applies in reviewing a superior court’s 
application of statutory aggravating and mitigating because whether particular conduct 
falls within the statutory standard of being among the least serious is a question of law.483 
Furthermore, the de novo standard ensures more uniformity in sentencing than a clearly 
erroneous standard.484  The supreme court thus remanded for review of the superior 
court’s application of the statutory factors under a de novo standard, noting that if the 
least-serious factor is still rejected, the case should be referred to a three-judge sentencing 
panel to consider the non-statutory factor of rehabilitation potential.485  The supreme 
court held that the de novo standard applies in reviewing a superior court’s application of 
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors to particular facts.486 
 
 
Nevers v. State 
 In Nevers v. State,487 the supreme court held that the exclusionary rule was not 
applicable to license revocation proceedings.488  Officers spotted Nevers driving drunk 
and attempted to pull him over.489  Nevers stopped his car and fled on foot to evade the 
officers but was later caught and arrested in his home for failure to submit to an alcohol 
breath test.490  Subsequently, Nevers’ drivers license was revoked.491  Nevers claimed 
that officers had no authority to enter his home and that any evidence discovered during 
the search was inadmissible.492  Two lower courts ruled that the exclusionary rule does 
not apply to license revocation proceedings.493  Nevers appealed to the supreme court.494  
The supreme court held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to license 
revocation proceedings except where police conduct either shocks the conscience or is 
consciously directed toward the unconstitutional arrest of a probationer.495  Because 
neither exception was applicable in this case, the supreme court affirmed the ruling of the 
superior court and upheld the license revocation.496 
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Munson v. State 
In Munson v. State,497 the supreme court held that a criminal defendant’s 
confession was inadmissible because he had unambiguously invoked his right to remain 
silent before he gave the confession.498  Munson was arrested and charged with 
murder.499  Early in his interrogation by police, he said, “Well, I’m done talkin’ then.”500  
The police officer continued to question Munson, and he confessed to the murder.501  The 
superior court suppressed the confession, but the court of appeals reversed, concluding 
that Munson’s statement was ambiguous.502  On appeal, the supreme court reasoned that 
the statement was sufficiently clear such that a reasonable officer would have understood 
it to be an unambiguous invocation of Munson’s right to silence, at which point the 
officer was bound to honor the decision.503  The supreme court reversed, holding that 
Munson’s confession was inadmissible because he made it after he had unambiguously 
invoked his right to remain silent.504 
 
 
Saltz v. State, Department of Administration 
 In Saltz v. State, Department of Administration,505 the supreme court upheld the 
revocation of a drunk driver’s license.506  After receiving a “Report Every Drunk Driver 
Immediately” (“REDDI”) call, a state trooper stopped Saltz as he left a bar in his truck.507  
After Saltz failed an alcohol breath test, the officer confiscated his license.508  The 
Division of Motor Vehicles held an administrative hearing and revoked Saltz’s license, 
finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the truck.509  Saltz appealed the 
revocation claiming that his truck did not match the description of the truck provided in 
the REDDI call.510  The supreme court held that while Saltz’s truck did not exactly match 
the description given in the REDDI call, based on the similarities in color and model and 
the proximity in time between the call and the stop, the officer had reasonable suspicion 
to stop Saltz’s truck.511  Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the hearing officer’s 
findings and upheld the revocation of Saltz’s license.512 
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Nevers v. State 
 In Nevers v. State,513 the supreme court held that the exclusionary rule was not 
applicable to license revocation proceedings.514  Officers spotted Nevers driving drunk 
and attempted to pull him over.515  Nevers stopped his car and fled on foot to evade the 
officers but was later caught and arrested in his home for failure to submit to an alcohol 
breath test.516  Subsequently, Nevers’ drivers license was revoked.517  Nevers claimed 
that officers had no authority to enter his home and that any evidence discovered during 
the search was inadmissible.518  Two lower courts ruled that the exclusionary rule does 
not apply to license revocation proceedings.519  Nevers appealed to the supreme court.520  
The supreme court held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to license 
revocation proceedings except where police conduct either shocks the conscience or is 
consciously directed toward the unconstitutional arrest of a probationer.521  Because 
neither exception was applicable in this case, the supreme court affirmed the ruling of the 
superior court and upheld the license revocation.522 
 
 
Alaska Court of Appeals  
 
Sergie v. State 
 In Sergie v. State,523 the court of appeals held that convictions were based on 
sufficient evidence, that a trial judge is not required to appoint a new court-appointed 
attorney to an indigent client based solely on the client’s refusal to cooperate with the 
attorney, and that a conviction for attempted first-degree sexual assault requires the intent 
to engage in sexual penetration with reckless disregard for the victim’s consent.524  Sergie 
was convicted of attempted first-degree sexual assault, resisting arrest, interfering with a 
report of domestic violence, and two counts of fourth-degree assault.525  On appeal, 
Sergie argued that his convictions for attempted sexual assault and resisting arrest were 
based on insufficient evidence and that the trial court should have discharged his 
appointed counsel.526  Sergie further argued that the trial judge should have accepted his 
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proposed jury instruction that stated that, in order to convict for first-degree sexual 
assault, the jury must have found that Sergie intended the sexual penetration to be non-
consensual.527   The court of appeals affirmed the trial court on all issues, holding that the 
convictions were based on sufficient evidence,528  that the trial judge was not required to 
discharge Sergie’s court-appointed attorney based solely on Sergie’s refusal to cooperate 
with his attorney,529 and that a conviction of attempted first-degree sexual assault requires 
only the intent to engage in sexual penetration with reckless disregard for the victim’s 
consent.530 
 
 
Vandergriff v. State 
In Vandergriff v. State,531 the court of appeals held that a judge may impose a 
consecutive sentence exceeding the maximum term for the defendant’s most serious 
offense without submitting the issue to a jury when necessary to protect the public.532  
Vandergriff pled guilty to theft, burglary, and forgery, each with a five-year maximum 
and a three-year presumptive term.533  The superior court imposed three consecutive 
three-year sentences for a composite nine-year sentence, with three years suspended.534  
Vandergriff appealed, arguing that Blakely v. Washington535 prevented the judge from 
imposing consecutive sentences exceeding the presumptive or maximum term for the 
most serious offense.536  The court of appeals held that Blakely does not prevent a judge 
from imposing consecutive sentences and does not require a judge to submit the issue to a 
jury when the judge finds that a consecutive sentence totaling more than the maximum 
sentence for the most serious offense is necessary to protect the public.537  The court also 
held that the judge could impose the sentence to protect the public even though the 
crimes were not violent, that Vandergriff was not denied a right of confrontation, and that 
the sentence was not excessive.538  The court of appeals thus affirmed Vandergriff’s 
sentence, holding that a judge may impose a consecutive sentence exceeding the 
maximum term for the most serious offense without submitting the issue to a jury when 
necessary to protect the public.539 
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State v. Gibbs 
In State v. Gibbs,540 the court of appeals held that the legality of a first felony 
offender’s sentence was not affected by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Blakely v. Washington.541  Gibbs, a first-time offender, received a sentence of six years 
imprisonment with three years suspended for second-degree assault.542  Gibbs appealed 
her sentence, claiming that it was illegal in light of Blakely, which provides a defendant 
the right to have a jury decide factual issues that would increase the defendant’s 
sentence.543  The trial court granted her motion to correct her sentence.544  The court of 
appeals held that sentencing Gibbs to three years, less than the four-year presumptive 
term for second offenders, did not require proof of aggravating factors or extraordinary 
circumstances, and, as a result, Blakely did not apply.545  Therefore, the court of appeals 
reversed the trial court’s decision on the motion to correct the sentence, holding that 
Blakely was inapplicable when the unsuspended portion of a first felony offender’s 
sentence did not exceed the second offender’s presumptive term.546 
 
 
Mooney v. State 
In Mooney v. State,547 the court of appeals held that a defendant who brings a 
Batson548 challenge must do so before the jury venire is released and the jury is sworn 
in.549  In Mooney’s trial for sexual assault, he brought a Batson challenge after the jury 
was sworn in, arguing that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges based on race to 
exclude Alaska Natives from the jury.550  The court of appeals held that a Batson 
challenge cannot be brought after the jury venire is released and the jury is sworn in 
because if a challenge is not timely, the prosecutor may have forgotten the reason for 
challenging particular jurors and the trial court may not have a reasonable opportunity to 
fashion a remedy.551  Thus, the court of appeals affirmed Mooney’s conviction, holding 
that in order for a Batson challenge to be timely, it must be made before the jury venire is 
dismissed and the jury is sworn in.552 
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Dayton v. State 
In Dayton v. State,553 the court of appeals held that a first time felony offender 
could receive an unsuspended sentence equal to the presumptive sentence for a second 
time offender without a showing of aggravating factors.554  Dayton pled no contest to 
third-degree assault and was sentenced to four years in prison with two years 
suspended.555  He appealed, arguing that in the absence of aggravating factors, a first 
felony offender’s time to serve must be more favorable than the presumptive term for a 
second felony offender:  two years.556 The court of appeals held that aggravating factors 
are needed only if the defendant's time to serve exceeds the presumptive term for a 
second felony offender convicted of the same crime, because the legislature had 
superseded the common law rule.557  The court of appeals affirmed the sentence, holding 
that a first felony offender could receive an unsuspended sentence equal to the 
presumptive sentence for a second time offender without a showing of aggravating 
factors.558 
 
 
Nease v. State 
In Nease v. State,559 the court of appeals held that where a police officer had 
probable cause to stop a vehicle, his ulterior motives for the stop were irrelevant for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.560  Having suspected Nease of drunk driving earlier in the 
day, an officer stopped him for driving with a broken brake light and, upon inspection, 
arrested him for driving while intoxicated.561  Nease appealed the admission of evidence 
of his intoxication on grounds that the officer used the brake light as a pretext to stop him 
for drunk driving.562  The court of appeals held that officers may stop a car regardless of 
their subjective intent as long as they are objectively justified based on probable cause 
and do not depart from reasonable police practice.563  Since the officer had probable 
cause to stop Nease for a traffic violation and did not depart from reasonable police 
practice, he was objectively justified.564  Hence, the court of appeals affirmed the 
conviction, holding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation.565  
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Kenison v. State 
In Kenison v. State,566 the court of appeals held that the lower court did not err 
when it admitted evidence of a series of harassing behaviors both before and after a 
protective order when the violation of the protective order, along with the behavior, were 
elements of first-degree stalking.567  Kenison followed, harassed, and repeatedly 
contacted his ex-wife over a period of years.568  For part of that time, Kenison’s actions 
violated a protective order, giving rise to a charge of first-degree stalking.569  Kenison 
argued on appeal both that acts committed prior to the protective order were irrelevant570 
and that the jury should have been required to find a “course of conduct” exclusively 
during the time covered by the protective order.571  As to irrelevancy, the court of appeals 
held that acts committed prior to the protective order were relevant for purposes of 
demonstrating fear on the part of the victim, and defendant’s knowledge of the effect of 
his acts on the victim.572  The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the 
evidence could support a jury finding of multiple acts, constituting a course of conduct, 
during the period covered by the protective order.573 
 
 
Hurd v. State 
In Hurd v. State,574 the court of appeals upheld a defendant’s third-degree assault 
conviction  even though the conviction had been previously reversed.575  Hurd was 
initially convicted of three felonies: coercion, kidnapping, and third-degree assault.576  
The assault charge was later reversed because of merger with the kidnapping charge.577  
The kidnapping charge was then reversed on appeal,578 and on remand, Hurd was 
sentenced for his assault conviction.579  Hurd appealed, primarily on the ground that his 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy was violated by the assault conviction 
after that charge had been reversed.580  The court of appeals concluded that the previous 
reversal of the assault charge was contingent on the conviction for kidnapping, and 
accordingly, the court had authority to sentence Hurd for assault if he was not ultimately 
convicted of kidnapping.581  Hurd also argued that he was mistakenly sentenced because 
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the judge spoke with the prosecutor out of his presence582 and that his sentence was 
overly-severe in comparison to his sentence for kidnapping.583  The court rejected the 
former alleged procedural violation as harmless584 and the latter because the assault 
sentence was less harsh than his kidnapping sentence.585  Finally, the court of appeals 
agreed with the state that Hurd is barred from bringing new challenges to the assault 
charge, which were not raised in the first appeal.586  In sum, the court of appeals held that 
it was not double jeopardy to reinstate a previously reversed assault conviction when that 
reversal was based on merger with, and contingent upon a conviction for, kidnapping, 
when the kidnapping conviction was reversed.587 
 
 
Rodgers v. State 
In Rodgers v. State,588 the court of appeals held that a traffic stop that was not 
supported by a reasonable suspicion of imminent danger to the public or recent 
occurrence of serious harm to persons or property was not legal absent probable cause.589  
The district court held that Rodgers’ traffic stop was justified because the officer had an 
erroneous but good-faith and reasonable belief that the defendant ran a stop sign.590  The 
court of appeals held that the stop did not meet the Coleman v. State591 test, under which 
an investigative stop must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of either imminent 
danger to the public or recent occurrence of serious harm to persons or property.592  The 
court of appeals reasoned Rodgers’ stop would only be legal if the officer had probable 
cause to believe he had observed the defendant run the stop sign.593  The court of appeals 
could not determine whether the superior court judge used “probable cause” analysis, so 
it remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the officer had 
probable cause to believe he had seen Rodgers run the stop sign.594 
 
 
State v. Morgan 
In State v. Morgan,595 the court of appeals held that requiring younger offenders 
to stay on probation longer does not violate the state equal protection clause.596  Morgan 
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was charged with possessing, controlling, or consuming alcoholic beverages by a person 
under the age of twenty-one.597  A punishment for this was probation for either one year 
or until that person reaches the age of twenty-one, whichever is longer.598  Morgan 
moved for dismissal, arguing that the statute violated the state equal protection clause by 
requiring younger offenders to stay on probation longer than older offenders.599  The 
district court agreed and dismissed the case.600  The court of appeals reversed the district 
court’s ruling, holding that requiring younger offenders to stay on probation longer does 
not violate the state equal protection clause because there is a substantial relationship 
between the legislature’s goal of preventing underage drinking and requiring offenders to 
stay on probation until they are twenty-one years old.601    
 
 
Snyder v. State 
In Snyder v. State,602 the court of appeals held that evidence of an alleged assault 
victim’s demeanor that was inconsistent with the victim’s testimony was admissible.603  
Snyder was charged with sexual assault against M.K.604  Snyder sought to admit evidence 
that after the alleged assault, M.K. did not appear to be afraid of or angry with Snyder.605  
The trial court excluded the evidence, explaining that it was of little probative value and 
posed a danger of unfair prejudice.606  The court of appeals reversed, holding that the 
evidence should not have been excluded because the State relied on evidence that M.K. 
was upset after the assault and ignored Snyder’s theory that M.K. consented.607  The 
court of appeals found that the jury should have been allowed to weigh the evidence to 
assess M.K.’s credibility.608  Thus, the court found that this was not a harmless error and 
reversed Snyder’s conviction, holding that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of 
the victim’s demeanor.609  
 
 
State v. Koen 
In State v. Koen,610 the court of appeals held that a warrant application was 
defective and insufficient because it did not identify the house that was searched as the 
defendant’s residence and did not explain the connection between the premises and the 
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evidence being sought.611  After receiving a report that Koen had child pornography on 
his computer, an Alaska State Trooper applied for, and obtained, a warrant to search a 
specific house.612  The affidavit submitted by the trooper to the magistrate, however, did 
not explain how this specific house, Koen, or the claimed child pornography evidence 
were connected to the reported crime.613  The superior court held that these omissions 
amounted to a fatal flaw in the warrant application and suppressed the evidence that was 
obtained under the warrant.614  On appeal, the court of appeals held that while the search 
warrant contained adequate information to support a search of the computers at Koen’s 
residence, it did not contain information as to where that residence could be located.615  
The court further held that while the trooper may have made reasonable inferences about 
which house was Koen’s residence, the Fourth Amendment requires a high level of 
particularity and that such inferences be explained on the affidavit so that the magistrate 
could independently evaluate it.616  Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the suppression of 
the evidence obtained under the warrant.617 
 
 
Pilant v. State 
In Pilant v. State,618 the court of appeals upheld a jury instruction that allowed 
jurors to infer the defendant’s blood alcohol level while driving was at least equal to the 
level recorded by a breath test.619  Pilant was arrested for driving under the influence and 
submitted to a breath test.620  At trial, the district court gave an instruction allowing, but 
not requiring, the jury to infer the test reading was equal to or less than Pilant’s actual 
blood-alcohol level while driving.621  The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the jury 
instruction was proper since the instruction neither created a mandatory presumption nor 
inappropriately shifted the burden of proof, but was rather a permissive inference.622   
 
 
 
Howell v. State 
In Howell v. State,623 the court of appeals held that double jeopardy prevents the 
state from appealing an evidentiary ruling that has the effect of an acquittal.624  Howell 
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was charged with felony drunk driving based on operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated and prior out-of-state convictions for the same offense.625  The superior court 
held that the evidence of prior convictions was insufficient to support the felony 
charge.626  The court of appeals denied the state’s cross-appeal, holding that an 
evidentiary ruling on a factual element of an offense operates like an acquittal and that 
double jeopardy bars the state from appealing the decision.627  
 
 
Bryant v. State 
In Bryant v. State,628 the court of appeals held that a man convicted of sexual 
abuse of a minor did not have valid challenges to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings but 
remanded the case on his challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel.629  Bryant was 
convicted of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor.630  On appeal, Bryant argued that the 
lower court improperly denied his motion to present evidence about the victim’s mother’s 
prior false claims of sexual abuse631 and improperly admitted plaintiff’s rebuttal evidence 
about his character.632  The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s evidentiary rulings 
as within its discretion633 but remanded the ineffective assistance of counsel claim for 
further findings of fact.634   
 
 
Degrate v. State  
 In Degrate v. State,635 the court of appeals held that a trial court judge does not 
have the authority to order the Department of Corrections to permit a prisoner to serve his 
sentence under house arrest and electronic monitoring.636  Degrate was convicted of 
second- and third-degree assault and sentenced to seven years in prison.637  Degrate then 
filed a motion asking the trial court judge to modify the sentence and order the 
Department of Corrections to allow him to serve the sentence under house arrest and 
electronic monitoring.638  The judge denied the motion, and Degrate appealed.639  The 
court of appeals held that the sentencing judge has statutory authority to recommend 
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electronic monitoring but not to order the Commissioner of Corrections to impose it.640  
The court of appeals thus affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that it 
properly denied Degrate's motion.641 
 
 
Haag v. State 
 In Haag v. State,642 the court of appeals held that police had justifiable suspicion 
to stop a defendant shortly after a robbery, that a line up at which the defendant was 
identified was not improperly suggestive, and that the imposition of an aggravating factor 
in sentencing constituted plain error.643  Haag was convicted of first-degree robbery, 
evidence tampering, and fourth-degree controlled substance misconduct.644  He appealed 
his robbery conviction, claiming that he was illegally stopped and unconstitutionally 
shown in a line up for identification, and he appealed his sentence based on its 
severity.645  The court held that the police conducted an investigative stop with justifiable 
suspicion and that the line up was procedurally sound given the timing and circumstances 
of the stop.646  The court held that Haag’s sentence was given in error because the trial 
court did not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the existence of an aggravating 
factor.647  The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, vacated the robbery sentence, 
and remanded for re-sentencing.648 
 
 
Peltola v. State 
In Peltola v. State,649 the court of appeals held that an offender’s sentence was 
legal because it was within the statutory maximum, and because the offender admitted to 
the aggravating factor at issue.650  Peltola pled no contest to bootlegging and was 
sentenced within the two-year maximum for his class of felony.651  He appealed the 
length of his conviction, arguing that the judge impermissibly used factors not found by a 
jury in determining his sentence.652  The court of appeals held that because the sentence 
was less than the statutory maximum, any judicial finding of aggravating factors did not 
unconstitutionally increase the sentence.653  The court also held that even if the sentence 
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had exceeded the statutory maximum, it would have been legal because Peltola admitted 
the aggravating factor.654   
 
 
Edmonds v. State 
In Edmonds v. State,655 the court of appeals held that the United States Supreme 
Court’s holding in Blakely v. Washington656 was not violated by a partially consecutive 
sentence that exceeded the presumptive term for the defendant’s most serious offense.657 
Edmonds received a total sentence of thirty-seven years after the superior court imposed 
portions of four twenty-five-year presumptive terms for sexual assault and one fifteen-
year presumptive term for attempted sexual assault consecutively.658  Edmonds argued 
that Blakely prohibited the superior court from (1) imposing a composite sentence 
exceeding fifteen years and (2) imposing consecutive sentences.659  The court of appeals 
then rejected both of Edmonds’ arguments, holding that Edmonds’ sentence did not 
violate Blakely because (1) none of the sentences exceeded their respective crimes’ 
presumptive terms and (2) Blakely did not restrict the sentencing judge’s authority to 
impose partially consecutive sentences because that authority did not depend on proof of 
facts but derived from Alaska law at the time.660  Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the 
superior court’s decision, holding that Edmonds’ partially consecutive sentence did not 
violate Blakely.661 
 
 
Grohs v. State 
In Grohs v. State,662 the court of appeals held that a traffic stop for not having an 
illuminated rear license plate was not pretexual and that reliance on prior convictions as 
an aggravating factor for increasing a defendant’s maximum sentence without a jury trial 
was consistent with Blakely v. Washington.663  Grohs was stopped for not having an 
illuminated rear license plate, and he refused to take a breath alcohol test when 
subsequently arrested for driving under the influence.664  Grohs was convicted for 
refusing the breath test, and the trial judge sentenced him to a term that exceeded the 
presumptive term based on the aggravating factor of six similar prior convictions.665  
Grohs appealed, claiming that the stop was pretexual and that he had a right to a jury trial 
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for the extension of his sentence under Blakely.666  The court of appeals held that a stop 
for not having an illuminated rear license plate was not pretexual and that the trial court 
could rely on prior convictions as the basis for finding an aggravating factor without 
requiring a jury trial.667  The court of appeals thus affirmed Grohs’ conviction and 
sentence, holding that 1) he failed to show the stop was pretextual and 2) that the 
sentence was consistent with Blakely.668 
 
 
Ned v. State 
In Ned v. State,669 the court of appeals held that a violation of a defendant’s right 
to have a jury decide certain facts at trial is not grounds for reversal when a judge’s 
determination of those facts constitutes harmless error,670 that an increased sentence 
cannot be based on an aggravating factor that is already an element supporting the 
presumptive sentence,671 and that a defendant is not responsible for every expense related 
to the victim’s funeral.672  Ned, driving while intoxicated, had a car accident that killed a 
passenger in his car.673  Ned’s intoxication was not disputed at trial.674  At sentencing, the 
trial court imposed the presumptive sentence and added three years for the aggravating 
factor of using a dangerous instrument, his vehicle, during the crime.675  The trial court 
also held Ned liable for the airfare for the victim’s family and friends to attend the 
funeral.676  The court of appeals held that, although the jury did not decide the issue of 
intoxication, it was harmless error because the facts were overwhelming and not in 
dispute.677  However, the court also held that the three additional years added to the 
sentence were improperly imposed because they were based on an aggravating factor that 
was already an element of the presumptive sentence.678  Finally, as to funeral expenses, 
the court held that the scope for criminal restitution is limited to costs proximately caused 
by defendant’s actions and therefore did not extend to the travel expenses of distant 
relatives and friends.679  The court of appeals thus affirmed Ned’s conviction and upheld 
the presumptive sentence but vacated the additional portion of the sentence and the 
judgment ordering Ned to pay funeral travel expenses for friends and distant relatives.680 
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Grasser v. State 
In Grasser v. State,681 the court of appeals held that a sentence requiring a man to 
participate in a domestic violence rehabilitation program outside his place of residence 
would not impose an unreasonable financial burden.682  Grasser pled guilty to a number 
of crimes relating to domestic violence against his girlfriend.683  As part of his sentence, 
the district court ordered that Grasser participate in a rehabilitation program, which was 
located outside his place of residence.684  Grasser argued participation in the program 
would cause an unreasonable financial burden and that the district court lacked the 
authority to order that he participate in the program.685  First, the court upheld the 
sentence because the district court both offered detailed findings about the reasonableness 
of the costs involved and imposed no fine for any of Grasser’s convictions so that he 
could devote his money to travel expenses.686  Second, the court held that Grasser was 
estopped from arguing that the district court did not have the authority to order the 
rehabilitation program because Grasser’s plea agreement explicitly stated the district 
court could order his participation in the program.687  The court of appeals affirmed the 
district court’s judgment, holding that participation in the rehabilitation program outside 
Grasser’s place of residence was not an undue financial burden or an improper 
sentence.688 
 
 
Moore v. State 
 In Moore v. State,689 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s consent to a 
search had been based on a prior illegal search and was thus invalid.690  While on 
Moore’s property for unrelated reasons, police noticed that a shack in the backyard 
contained a methamphetamine laboratory.691  Prior to obtaining Moore’s consent to 
search his house, the police told him that they had already found the backyard lab.692  The 
district court found the backyard search to be illegal but found Moore’s consent to the 
search of his home to be valid.693  Moore was convicted on four counts of misconduct 
involving a controlled substance.694  The court of appeals held that when police obtain a 
defendant’s consent after conducting an illegal search or arrest, the consent is presumed 
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to be tainted, and the burden is on the government to demonstrate a break in the causal 
connection between the consent and the prior illegality.695  The court held that the State 
failed to meet this burden here and reversed Moore's convictions, holding that consent to 
a search based on a prior illegal search is invalid.696 
 
 
Ward v. State 
In Ward v. State,697 the court of appeals held evidence was sufficient to support a 
conviction for robbery when a man took merchandise while being observed by a security 
officer on camera and later used force during his escape.698  Ward was observed by a 
security camera concealing store merchandise.699  He later physically resisted an attempt 
by a security officer to detain him.700  Ward was convicted of robbery, theft, and 
assault.701  He appealed, claiming that because the security officer was not physically 
present when Ward concealed the merchandise, the property was not in the “immediate 
presence and control of another.”702  The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, 
holding the property did not need to be in physical contact with the officer, but only be 
sufficiently under his control that he could have prevented Ward from taking the property 
had he not been subjected to violence or intimidation.703  The court, however, vacated 
Ward’s sentence because the trial court judge had improperly relied on the assault, for 
which Ward was being separately sentenced, as an aggravating factor.704  The court of 
appeals affirmed Ward’s conviction but ordered the superior court to reconsider Ward’s 
sentence.705 
 
 
Grossman v. State 
In Grossman v. State,706 the court of appeals upheld a second-degree murder 
conviction and the accompanying ninety-nine year jail sentence of a man who was an 
accomplice to a murder.707  Grossman was involved in a dispute, which escalated to a 
beating and left one man dead.708  A jury convicted Grossman of second-degree murder 
and the judge sentenced him to ninety-nine years in jail.709  Grossman appealed, claiming 
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that the jury was improperly instructed on the meaning of an “accomplice,” and also that 
the sentence was outside the acceptable range of jail time for the crime.710  The court held 
that the jury was correctly instructed that an accomplice must have intent to promote or 
facilitate the conduct that constitutes the crime.711  The court further held that the ninety-
nine year sentence was appropriate in light of Grossman’s more than twenty prior 
convictions.712  The court of appeals affirmed, holding that both the second-degree 
murder conviction and the ninety-nine year jail sentence were proper.713 
 
 
McDole v. State 
 In McDole v. State,714 the court of appeals held that a defendant was a second 
felony offender for purposes of presumptive sentencing because his series of thefts began 
before the statutory ten-year period expired and that it was harmless error not to submit a 
question about an aggravating factor to the jury.715  McDole was convicted of thirty-one 
counts of unsworn falsification and one count of second-degree theft for unlawfully 
claiming employment benefits over a two-year period.716  In sentencing, the superior 
court found that McDole was a second felony offender and that an aggravating factor 
applied.717  McDole appealed both findings.718  The court of appeals found him to be a 
second felony offender because his conduct had amounted to second-degree theft before 
the ten-year limit for presumptive sentencing expired.719  The court of appeals also held 
that it was harmless error not to submit the question of an aggravating factor to the jury 
because no reasonable jury would find in his favor.720  The court of appeals found that 
McDole was properly sentenced as a second felony offender with the aggravating factor 
and affirmed the decision of the superior court.721 
 
 
Simon v. State 
 In Simon v. State,722 the court of appeals held that there was no plain error in the 
sentencing of a convicted felon.723  Simon was charged with third-degree sexual assault 
and was a third felony offender based on his prior convictions.724  Simon agreed to a plea 
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that would result in a sentence of three to five years.725  The superior court sentenced 
Simon to five years, and Simon appealed.726  The court of appeals held that because 
Simon’s attorney did not object to the sentencing procedure at trial, Simon would have to 
show plain error on appeal, which he did not.727  In order for there to be plain error, the 
court of appeals held, Simon would have to show that there was no tactical reason for the 
failure to raise the objection at trial and that the error was so obvious that it would be 
recognized by a competent judge or lawyer.728  The court also found that Simon did not 
waive his right to challenge the severity of his sentence by signing the plea agreement.729  
However, the court held that five years was appropriate.730  The court of appeals affirmed 
the lower court’s ruling, holding that Simon’s five year sentence was not in plain error.731 
 
 
Snelling v. State  
In Snelling v. State,732 the court of appeals held that there was no error in failing 
to give a defendant a jury trial.733  Snelling was prosecuted for possession of cocaine.734  
He agreed to a plea agreement and admitted to having a prior federal felony conviction 
for a bank robbery.735  Because of his prior felony conviction, the superior court applied 
two aggravating factors to increase Snelling’s term of imprisonment.736  Snelling 
appealed the increased term, claiming that he was entitled to a jury trial with respect to 
the aggravating factors.737  The court of appealed affirmed the increased term because 
robbery was a more serious class felony than possession of cocaine without intent to 
distribute and the superior court properly applied this factor.738 
 
 
Moore v. State 
In Moore v. State,739 the court of appeals held that a defendant needed more than 
just general dissatisfaction to remove his court appointed attorney and that the 
defendant’s first-degree and second-degree sexual assault sentencing should have been 
merged.740  Moore was convicted of attempted first-degree sexual assault, attempted 
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second-degree sexual assault, and first-degree burglary.741  On the first day of trial, 
Moore tried to have his attorney removed from the case because of general dissatisfaction 
with him, but the trial court denied this request.742  Moore appealed his conviction, 
claiming the trial court erred in denying his request to replace his attorney and that his 
first-degree and second-degree attempted sexual assault sentencing should have been 
merged.743  The court of appeals held that the right to counsel did not include the right to 
reject an appointed counsel without showing cause. 744  To determine such a showing, the 
trial judge was required to inquire into the nature of the dispute.745  Because the trial 
judge did inquire into the nature of the dispute and found insufficient reason for 
substitution of counsel, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not err in its 
decision.746  Finally, the court of appeals held that the sentencing of the first-degree and 
second-degree attempted sexual assault charges should be merged because the two 
statutes protected fundamentally the same societal interest and there was no significant or 
substantial difference in Moore’s intent or conduct in the two crimes.747  
 
 
Allen v. State 
In Allen v. State,748 the court of appeals held that a man convicted of driving with 
a suspended license was entitled to a jury instruction on necessity.749  Allen’s mother had 
been driving the car, and Allen took over when she began to feel ill and started 
weaving.750  At trial, Allen claimed the defense of necessity, alleging that he drove to get 
to a nearby payphone to call for medical help for his mother.751  The trial judge 
concluded, as a matter of law, that Allen had an adequate and reasonably available 
alternative of walking to a closer payphone and thus denied the jury instruction on 
necessity and precluded evidence on it.752  The court of appeals held that the adequacy of 
a reasonable alternative is only a question of law if the defendant knew or had reason to 
know of the alternative.753  Because Allen presented evidence to show that he believed 
his mother was in need of speedy medical attention and that he did not know there was a 
closer phone, the jury could properly have found in favor of Allen.754  The appellate court 
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reversed and granted a new trial, holding Allen was entitled to a jury instruction on 
necessity.755 
 
 
Anderson v. State 
In Anderson v. State,756 the court of appeals held a defendant’s identification 
made during a show-up was allowable because it was necessary,757 his throwing a gun 
out of a window during a chase was not tampering with evidence,758 and his sentence was 
improper because it relied on an aggravating factor based on conduct for which he was 
being separately sentenced.759  While being chased by police shortly after he committed a 
crime, Anderson threw his gun out the window.760  He was caught and identified by the 
victim during a show-up, where he was the only suspect shown to the victim.761  The 
court first upheld the use of the show-up, stating that since the show-up was necessary 
under the circumstances, the court did not need to further assess the reliability of the 
witness.762  Second, the court held that although tossing evidence in some cases could 
constitute evidence tampering, doing so here would frustrate legislative intent.763  Finally, 
the court held Anderson’s sentence was improper because his sentence was partly based 
on conduct for which he had been separately sentenced.764  The court of appeals reversed 
his conviction for evidence tampering and remanded for sentencing for his other 
crimes.765 
 
 
State v. Thomas 
In State v. Thomas,766 the court of appeals held that a probation condition is 
proper when reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the offender.767  Thomas was 
indicted on the basis of evidence found during a drug search that was a condition of his 
parole.768  A superior court suppressed the evidence on the theory that the drug-search 
probation condition was invalid because it was not directly related to the prior 
conviction.769  The court of appeals reversed, holding that the condition was valid 
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because Thomas’s record showed a history of drug problems.770  The court of appeals 
held that a probation condition need not be directly related to the elements of the crime 
committed as long as it is reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the offender.771 
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VII.  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
 
Ninth Circuit  
 
Galvan v. Department of Corrections 
In Galvan v. Department of Corrections,772 the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant 
who had not raised a federal constitutional claim in the state supreme court had not 
exhausted state remedies.773  Galvan pled guilty to second degree murder, but then sought 
post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.774  After 
lower courts denied her federal and state claims,775  Galvan petitioned the supreme court 
for review of her state claims only.776  After the supreme court denied her petition, she 
filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus.777  The district court dismissed her 
petition because she had not exhausted her state and federal claims in the state supreme 
court.778  Galvan appealed.779  The Ninth Circuit held that regardless of whether she 
addressed the federal issues before the court of appeals, Galvan would have had to bring 
them before the state supreme court in order to fully exhaust the available state 
remedies.780  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, dismissing Galvan’s 
habeas petition because she yet to exhaust all available state remedies.781   
 
 
Alaska Court of Appeals  
 
Paige v. State 
  In Paige v. State,782 the court of appeals held that a convicted criminal’s multiple 
sentences must be concurrent when the sentencing judge did not specify whether the 
defendant’s sentences would be concurrent or consecutive.783  Paige was convicted of 
multiple crimes arising out of two different incidents.784  At Paige’s sentencing, the 
presiding judge did not specify whether the sentences would be concurrent or consecutive 
but stated later, in a written opinion, that the sentences would be served consecutively.785  
The court of appeals held that a judge’s oral sentencing remarks control over a later, 
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conflicting written judgment.786  Restricting its holding to sentences imposed under the 
former sentencing statute,787 the court of appeals reversed the imposition of consecutive 
sentences,788 holding that because the judge’s remarks did not clearly show an intent to 
impose consecutive sentences, the sentences should be imposed concurrently.789 
 
 
Yang v. State 
 In Yang v. State,790 the court of appeals held that it was reasonable to infer that a 
non-native English speaker understood his legal obligation to submit to a breath test 
when he refused such a test, and that evidence of the driver’s prior submission to a breath 
test was properly admitted.791  Yang, who claimed a poor command of English,792 refused 
to submit to a breath alcohol test after being warned that if he refused he would be 
charged with a crime.793  He was subsequently convicted of refusing to submit to the 
breath test.794  The court held that evidence of Yang’s prior submission to a breath test 
was properly admitted, because one could reasonably infer from this that he was familiar 
with the test and understood what the officer was asking him to do.795  The court further 
held that giving or understanding specific warnings about the repercussions of refusing a 
breath test were not separate elements of the crime of breath test refusal.796  Rather, the 
State had to prove Yang understood, or reasonably should have understood, the purpose 
of the breath test and his legal obligation to take the test.797  The court held the evidence 
was sufficient to support the inference that Yang understood both the purpose of the test 
and the legal obligation to take it,798 and accordingly affirmed his conviction.799 
 
 
Soundara v. State 
In Soundara v. State,800 the court of appeals held that (1) a presumptive term for 
mitigated kidnapping was valid, (2) a defendant’s convictions for assault merged, as the 
jury did not determine the number of underlying acts, and (3) the court should have 
determined whether a juror knowingly withheld relevant information and should have 
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been dismissed for cause.801  Soundara was convicted of mitigated kidnapping and assault 
of his wife.802  During voir dire, juror Stahn did not respond when was asked whether 
there was any reason he could not serve fairly as a juror.803  After the trial began, Stahn 
revealed that his mother had been a victim of domestic violence, but he remained on the 
jury.804  On appeal, Soundara argued that the seven-year term was unfair for mitigated 
kidnapping because normal kidnapping carries a five-year mandatory sentence.805  The 
court rejected this argument, distinguishing mandatory sentences from presumptive 
sentencing.806  The court also found that the two assault convictions must merge because 
the jury was not asked whether two separate acts were committed.807  Finally, the court 
held that the district court erred by not determining whether Stahn had consciously 
withheld that his mother had been a victim of domestic violence during voir dire.808  The 
court of appeals remanded for such a determination and further instructed that if 
Soundara (1) would have challenged Stahn based on this information, (2) the information 
was directly relevant to the case and (3) there was a reasonable possibility that Stahn’s 
knowledge affected Stahn's vote, Soundara would be entitled to a new trial.809 
 
 
McBath v. State 
In McBath v. State,810 the court of appeals held that drugs found on an individual 
during an arguably illegal investigative stop were obtained lawfully because there were 
pre-existing warrants for the individual’s arrest.811  During the course of an arguably 
illegal investigative traffic stop, the police learned of two unserved warrants for 
McBath’s arrest.812  The discovery of methamphetamines during a search ultimately led 
to McBath’s conviction for possession of controlled substances.813  McBath appealed on 
the grounds that any evidence obtained as a result of the illegal stop must be 
suppressed.814  The court of appeals held that a pre-existing arrest warrant can attenuate 
the taint of a prior illegal stop when evidence was discovered during the execution of that 
warrant.815  The court further found that the initial illegal stop was not a manifestation of 
flagrant police misconduct.816  Because the police found methamphetamines only after 
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learning of McBath’s outstanding warrants, and because they had a valid reason for 
initially detaining McBath to ascertain his identity, the court held that any taint was too 
attenuated to affect the admissibility of the contraband.817  Thus, the judgment of the 
superior court was affirmed.818 
 
 
State v. Savo 
In State v. Savo,819 the court of appeals held that a defendant did not receive 
ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial.820  Following his conviction for sexual 
assault, Savo petitioned for post-conviction relief on the grounds that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel.821  The superior court granted Savo’s petition for a new 
trial, based primarily on his attorney’s cross examination of the victim, and the state 
appealed.822  The court of appeals first determined that the state was not procedurally 
barred from appealing the superior court’s ruling by failing to submit a supplemental 
memorandum to the superior court in support of its argument.823  The court of appeals 
found each of Savo’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel to be unfounded and 
therefore he did not suffer ineffective assistance of counsel and was not prejudiced.824  
The court of appeals reversed the ruling of the superior court and reinstated Savo’s 
conviction.825 
 
 
Baker v. State 
 In Baker v. State,826 the court of appeals upheld the denial of a defendant's motion 
to dismiss based on his right to a speedy trial, holding that the trial court erred in 
imposing a consecutive and excessive sentence.827  Baker  appealed his convictions for 
felony driving while intoxicated, felony refusal to take a breath test, driving with a 
revoked license, and third degree criminal mischief.828  The court of appeals held that the 
trial court did not err in denying Baker’s motion to dismiss based on his right to a speedy 
trial.829  The court of appeals also held that Baker’s sentence was improper and excessive 
because the trial court judge orally indicated during sentencing that the sentence should 
have been concurrent with rather than consecutive to his previous sentence.830  Moreover, 
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because the trial court improperly found that Baker was previously convicted of a more 
serious felony it wrongly imposed consecutive minimum sentences.831  Therefore, the 
court of appeals affirmed Baker’s conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded for 
re-sentencing.832 
 
 
Ratliff v. State 
 In Ratliff v. State,833 the court of appeals held that a formal test for evaluating the 
validity of scientific evidence was not required for shoeprint analysis and that a 
criminologist's shoeprint analysis was based on valid principles and methodology.834  
Ratliff was convicted of burglary, theft, and criminal mischief where his shoeprint 
matched that of a shoeprint found at the scene of the crime.835  At trial, Ratliff challenged 
the validity of the shoeprint analysis, and the trial court judge concluded that formal 
analysis of the expert testimony was not necessary or, in the alternative, that it would 
meet the requirements of formal analysis.836  Ratliff only appealed the conclusion that 
formal analysis was not required.837  The court of appeals held that the trial judge fulfilled 
his duty with respect to expert testimony by evaluating the evidence and determining that 
a formal analysis of the methodology was not required.838  The court of appeals found 
that no error was committed in allowing the shoeprint evidence and affirmed the superior 
court's decision.839 
 
 
Gladden v. State 
In Gladden v. State,840 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s right to counsel 
was violated because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive it.841  Gladden, who 
was accused of driving with a suspended license, informed the trial judge that he did not 
want court-appointed counsel.842  He pursued private counsel by means the superior court 
deemed unlikely to be successful, and the court allowed the case to go to trial despite 
Gladden’s lack of representation.843  After trial, Gladden was convicted.844  The court of 
appeals held that, although Gladden’s actions did imply pro se representation, the record 
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did not show that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.845  The 
record was deficient in this regard because there was no evidence that the judge explained 
what an attorney could offer, outlined the risks of pro se representation, asked Gladden if 
he understood these risks, or inquired into Gladden’s educational background and 
experience with the criminal justice system.846  The court of appeals reversed the 
conviction, holding that the record did not reflect a knowing and intelligent waiver of the 
right to counsel.847 
 
 
State v. Cameron 
In State v. Cameron,848 the court of appeals held that a prosecutor was not 
required to notify the grand jury of the defendant’s desire to testify.849  After being 
arrested for assault, Cameron requested to testify before the grand jury, but the prosecutor 
did not respond or notify the grand jury of the request.850  The superior court granted 
Cameron’s request to dismiss his subsequent indictment, and the State appealed.851  
Cameron argued on appeal that (1) his proposed testimony was exculpatory evidence and 
therefore must be presented to the grand jury, and (2) the prosecutor had a duty to notify 
the grand jury of his desire to testify.852  The court of appeals rejected both arguments, 
holding that Cameron’s testimony was not exculpatory evidence because it did not tend 
to negate his guilt in and of itself, and that requiring the prosecutor to notify the grand 
jury of his request would modify pre-existing common law.853  Therefore, the court of 
appeals reversed, holding that the prosecutor did not have a duty to grant Cameron’s 
request or notify the grand jury.854  
 
 
Kelly v. State 
In Kelly v. State,855 the court of appeals held that testimony supporting an 
affirmative defense should have been admitted under a hearsay exception.856  Kelly was 
charged with sexual abuse of a minor for having contact and attempting to engage in 
sexual intercourse with K.P., who was under 16 years of age.857  On the evening of the 
incident, Kelly told a friend, Andrews, that he believed K.P. to be 16 years old.858  But 
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the trial court determined Andrews’ statements were inadmissible hearsay and that Kelly 
failed to present sufficient evidence supporting an affirmative defense.859  The court of 
appeals held that a defendant’s out of court assertion of innocence may be introduced as 
an exception to the hearsay rule if the statement (1) relates to the declarant’s then existing 
state of mind, (2) is not offered to prove the fact believed, and (3) relates to a relevant 
purpose and is offered only for that purpose.860  Because the statement pertained to 
Kelly’s state of mind at the time of the crime, was not offered to prove that K.P. was in 
fact 16 years old, and was relevant to prove a reasonable mistake of fact, the court of 
appeals determined that Andrews’ testimony was admissible under a hearsay 
exception.861  Because exclusion of the testimony undermined Kelly’s defense, the court 
reversed Kelly’s convictions.862 
 
 
State v. Anderson 
In State v. Anderson,863 the court of appeals held that sending in a “false friend” to 
get a jailed suspect to make incriminating statements does not violate Miranda.864  After 
arresting Anderson for a robbery, police enlisted a friend of Anderson’s to elicit 
statements from him about another robbery he may have committed.865  The superior 
court suppressed Anderson’s statements, ruling that it was unfair to allow the police to 
circumvent Anderson’s right to counsel by enlisting a “false friend.”866  However, the 
court of appeals ruled that Anderson could have chosen to not speak with the “false 
friend” and was not subjected to a coercive atmosphere.867  Therefore, the court of 
appeals reversed the superior court, holding that police do not violate Miranda when they 
enlist a “false friend” to obtain incriminating statements from a suspect.868 
 
 
Swarner v. Alaska 
 In Swarner v. Alaska,869 the court of appeals held that an extradition request in the 
form of an information sworn before a notary was legal under Alaska’s extradition 
laws.870  Montana’s governor requested that Alaska’s governor arrest Swarner via an 
information sworn before a notary.871  Swarner was arrested in Alaska and petitioned for 
a writ of habeas corpus to contest his extradition by claiming that federal extradition law 
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required an extradition document to be made before a magistrate and not a notary.872  The 
superior court denied Swarner’s petition for the writ, and he appealed.873  The court of 
appeals held that federal extradition law set circumstances under which a state must 
extradite but also allowed states to authorize additional methods of extradition.874  
Because an information sworn in front of a notary is a valid form of extradition under 
Alaska law, the court of appeals held that the extradition request was proper and affirmed 
the superior court’s denial of Swarner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.875 
 
 
Greist v. State 
In Greist v. State,876 the court of appeals held that a judge may use a defendant’s 
prior convictions as an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes without holding a jury 
trial on that factor.877  Greist was sentenced to three years in prison for third-degree 
assault.878  Greist appealed the sentence, arguing that it violated the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington879 because he did not receive a jury 
trial on any aggravating factors.880  The court of appeals held that Blakely expressly 
allowed the use of prior convictions as a sentencing factor without the need for a jury trial 
or proof beyond a reasonable doubt.881  Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the sentence, 
holding that the superior court could consider Greist’s prior convictions as an aggravating 
factor without a jury trial.882 
 
 
State v. Gonzales 
 In State v. Gonzales,883 the court of appeals held that a ten-year delay between an 
investigation and its resulting charges was cause for dismissal of those charges because 
the State lacked a valid reason for the delay.884  Also, the State’s loss of certain evidence 
prejudiced the defendant.885  In 1992, Gonzales was interviewed as the suspect in an 
investigation of sexual abuse of a minor.886  Gonzales then left Alaska and the State 
searched for his whereabouts with no success.887  In 2002, Gonzales was found and 
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charged with sexual abuse pursuant to the 1992 investigation and also new crimes 
committed in 2002.888  Gonzales moved to dismiss the charges from the 1992 
investigation, and the superior court granted his motion.889  The State appealed.890  The 
court of appeals held that the ten-year gap violated the defendant’s due process rights 
because the State lacked a valid reason for the delay, and the delay prejudiced the 
defendant in that significant evidence relating to the investigation was lost, adversely 
affecting his ability to present a defense.891  The court of appeals affirmed the superior 
court’s dismissal of the State’s claims.892 
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VIII.  ELECTION LAW 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage  
 In DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage,893 the supreme court held that random 
selection of a fixed order of candidates’ names on an election ballot was constitutional 
and that there was no significant deviation from the law to affect the election outcome by 
which to invalidate a voter approved amendment.894  DeNardo sued the Municipality of 
Anchorage alleging that the fixed order of the candidates’ names on the 2003 Anchorage 
mayoral election ballot created a positional bias that impermissibly burdened the right to 
vote.895  De Nardo argued that procedural defects in the election should invalidate the 
passage of Proposition 2, which removed run-off elections, except for mayoral races, 
when no candidates receive more than 45% of the vote.896  The superior court dismissed 
the case on summary judgment and DeNardo appealed.897  The supreme court found that 
Sonneman v. State,898 which held that positional bias does not impermissibly burden the 
right to vote, controlled here; even though the positional bias may have affected the 
election results.899  Furthermore, the supreme court found that challengers to post-
election contests have the burden of showing that there was a significant deviation from 
the law that affected the result of the election.900  DeNardo failed to meet this burden and 
hence, the supreme court affirmed the summary judgment.901  
 
 
Martinez v. Cape Fox Corp. 
In Martinez v. Cape Fox Corp.,902 the supreme court held 1) that the superior 
court had the authority to bar from reelection a board member who engaged in 
misconduct even though he was not a director at the time of the judgment;903 2) that the 
evidence supported a fifteen-year ban from board service, but not a lifetime ban;904 3) 
that the superior court was not required to make a specific finding on the board member’s 
“unclean hands” defense;905 and 4) that the board member was not entitled to partial 
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indemnification.906  Martinez was a director of Cape Fox who was found to have 
committed fraud and abused his authority as director.907  The superior court entered an 
order barring Martinez for life from service as director for Cape Fox and entered a 
monetary judgment against him.908  Martinez appealed.909  The court held that a director 
may be barred from future service regardless of whether that director was serving on the 
board at the time the complaint was filed.910  Also, the court articulated a seven-factor 
test for determining whether a ban is proper: 1) the egregiousness of the underlying 
violation, 2) the defendant’s past record of misconduct, 3) the defendant’s position or role 
at the time of the violation, 4) the defendant’s degree of scienter, 5) the defendant’s 
economic stake in the violation, 6) the likelihood that the misconduct would recur, and 7) 
whether there is reason to suspect that the shareholder democracy will not be sufficient to 
prevent reelection of an unfit director.911  Here, the court found five of the seven factors 
to be present: 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6.912  However, the court found these findings to be sufficient 
to impose a fifteen-year ban, but not a lifetime ban.913  Furthermore, the court found that 
the superior court did not err in refusing to make a specific finding on Martinez’s claim 
of “clean hands” because he presented no evidence with regard to this defense.914  
Finally, the court held that Martinez was not entitled to partial indemnification because 
the jury found against him on all issues.915  The court affirmed the judgment against 
Martinez, vacated the lifetime bar from board service, and remanded with instruction to 
enter a new order barring Martinez from board service for fifteen years.916 
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IX.  EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
 
Ninth Circuit  
 
Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. 
In Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,917 the Ninth Circuit held that an employee has a 
legitimate claim under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) only if he actually 
participated in the care of a family member.918  Tellis, an employee of Alaska Airlines, 
was terminated because of unexcused absences.919  Tellis and his union filed a grievance 
in response, and Alaska Airlines offered to reinstate him if he would allow a disciplinary 
letter to be placed in his file.920  Tellis did not agree and subsequently sued.921  The 
district court granted Alaska Airlines’ motion for summary judgment finding that Tellis 
did not present a valid claim under the FMLA because he did not leave his job to care for 
his pregnant wife as he had claimed.922  Tellis appealed.923  The Ninth Circuit held that 
family care under the FMLA required actual care for a family member and that Tellis’ 
absences were not a result of care for his pregnant wife.924  As a result, his absence from 
work was not protected under the FMLA.925  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Alaska Airlines.926 
 
 
EEOC v. National Education Ass'n, Alaska  
In EEOC v. National Education Ass’n, Alaska,927 the Ninth Circuit held that 
offensive conduct that is not facially sex-specific may violate Title VII if there is 
sufficient circumstantial evidence of differences in harassment suffered by female and 
male employees.928  Three female employees of the National Education Association 
("NEA") filed Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charges against 
the NEA because of harassment by their employer in the form of hostile shouting and 
physical conduct.929  The district court granted the NEA's motion for summary judgment, 
stating that there was no evidence of sex-specific harassment, and the EEOC appealed.930  
The Ninth Circuit held that the difference in subjective effects as well as objective 
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aspects of the alleged discrimination is relevant to whether women were treated 
differently than men, even if the conduct was not facially sex-specific or gender-
specific.931  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's granting of summary 
judgment and remanded the case, holding that there was sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable person to conclude that the harassment was because of sex and was 
sufficiently severe to support a Title VII claim.932 
 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Hammond v. State, Department of Transportation & Public Facilities 
 In Hammond v. State, Department of Transportation & Public Facilities,933 the 
supreme court held that an employee’s decision to arbitrate under a collective bargaining 
agreement did not preclude the litigation of a related statutory claim.934  After being 
terminated, Hammond filed a grievance under his union’s collective bargaining 
agreement.935  The arbitrator ruled against Hammond.936  Hammond subsequently 
brought a statutory claim in superior court.937  The court granted summary judgment 
against Hammond, holding that the decision of the arbitrator precluded him from 
litigating his statutory claim.938  The supreme court held that an employee’s statutory 
claim could be precluded only if that employee clearly and unmistakably submitted the 
claim to arbitration.939  Since Hammond had not clearly and unmistakably submitted it to 
arbitration, his statutory claim was not precluded and the court reversed and remanded for 
litigation as to the statutory claim.940 
 
 
Bartley v. State, Department of Administration 
In Bartley v. State, Department of Administration,941 the supreme court held that: 
1) two teachers who retired under the Teachers’ Retirement System (“TRS”) were only 
eligible for early retirement under the Teachers’ Defined Retirement Plan, and 2) the TRS 
board improperly used two different rates to calculate their arrearage indebtedness.942  
The Bartleys taught for the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) in Alaska and out of state , 
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became TRS members, and retired.943  The TRS board found the Bartleys were only 
eligible for early retirement and used two separate rates to determine the Bartleys’ 
arrearage indebtedness: one for teaching for the BIA and the other for teaching outside of 
Alaska.944  The superior court upheld the board’s findings.945  The supreme court upheld 
the finding that the Bartleys were only eligible for early retirement.946  In doing so, the 
court held that to qualify for normal retirement under Alaska Statutes section 
14.25.110(a)(1), teachers must have been first hired into a TRS position July 1, 1975.947  
The “first hired” language refers only to when a teacher is hired into a TRS position and 
does not encompass any creditable non-TRS service.948  The Bartleys were merely hired 
into BIA service, not a TRS position, before July 1, 1975.949  Further, the supreme court 
held that the board improperly used two rates when calculating the Bartleys’ arrearage 
indebtedness.950  The court held that a claimant’s entire arrearage indebtedness should be 
calculated at a single rate.951  Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the finding that the 
Bartleys were eligible only for early retirement but remanded the case for recalculation of 
the arrearage indebtedness.952 
 
 
Bailey v. Texas Instruments 
In Bailey v. Texas Instruments,953 the supreme court held that a statute of 
limitations was constitutionally valid, that the statute applied to medical claims954 and 
that it barred a claimant from suing an employer regarding payment of some, but not all, 
of his workers compensation claims.955  Bailey was an injured worker who had been 
receiving workers compensation payments from his employer.956  Bailey’s employer 
disputed his claims for medical benefits in 1997, 1999 and 2001.957  Workers’ 
compensation claimants have two years to request a hearing after an employee disputes a 
claim.958  Bailey had knowledge of the statute of limitations, yet he neglected to request a 
hearing until July 2002.959  The superior court determined that the 1999 and 2001 claims 
could not restart the statute of limitations because they were merely restatements of the 
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1997 claim, and denied hearing all three claims.960  Bailey appealed on the grounds that 
the statute did not govern medical claims and was a constitutional violation of procedural 
due process, substantive due process and equal protection.961  Rejecting these arguments 
as without merit, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s determination that 
Bailey’s 1997 and 1999 claims should be dismissed as untimely.962  The supreme court 
reversed as to the 2001 claim, however, finding it was substantively distinct from the 
earlier claims and therefore within the statute of limitations.963  The case was remanded 
for further proceedings on the 2001 claim.964 
 
 
Rockney v. Boslough Construction Co. 
In Rockney v. Boslough Construction Co.,965 the supreme court held that 
substantial evidence failed to support findings that a workers’ compensation plan would 
meet a claimant’s remunerative wage and that the plan could be completed within the 
statutory time frame.966  The court further held that the statutory presumption of 
compensability did not apply.967  Rockney’s workers’ compensation reemployment plan 
provided that he be trained as an architectural drafter after he injured his back and could 
no longer work in construction.968  The supreme court held that reemployment plans must 
provide for remunerative employability969 and must be completed within two years of 
commencement.970  Here, the court found that there was no substantial evidence 
indicating that Rockney would be reemployed at his remunerative hourly wage or that he 
would be able to complete the plan within the statutory time limit.971  The supreme court 
held that the workers’ compensation board abused its discretion in approving Rockney’s 
reemployment plan.972  The court further rejected Rockney’s argument that a presumption 
of compensability should have been applied by the workers’ compensation board because 
no party disputed Rockney’s entitlement to benefits or his employer’s liability for those 
benefits.973 
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Ellison v. Local 375 
In Ellison v. Local 375,974 the supreme court held that a union is not liable for 
failing to respond to a sexually discriminatory environment unless it is asked to do so and 
declines for discriminatory reasons.975  Ellison reported several incidents of alleged 
sexual harassment and discrimination to union representatives976 but did not request that 
they file a grievance or take any other remedial action.977   Adopting the reasoning that 
unions have no duty to remedy racial or sexual harassment because they typically do not 
control the workplace, the supreme court held that mere passivity cannot create liability 
for a union978 and that union liability for non-action in response to discrimination requires 
both a request to take action and a refusal to do so for discriminatory reasons.979  
 
 
Ranney v. Whitewater Engineering 
In Ranney v. Whitewater Engineering,980 the supreme court held that the 
limitation of spousal death benefits to married couples does not violate rights to privacy 
and equal protection under the Alaska Constitution.981  Sharon Ranney was denied 
spousal death benefits after her long term partner died because they were unmarried.982  
The superior court upheld the compensation board’s conclusion that marriage is required 
in order to receive death benefits, and Ranney appealed.983  The supreme court held that 
the language of the spousal benefits statute did not apply to unmarried partners such as 
Ranney.984  The supreme court held that granting death benefits to married couples did 
not impose a significant burden on those who choose not to marry and therefore did not 
infringe Ranney’s right to have an unmarried relationship as guaranteed by Alaska’s right 
to privacy.985  Applying the state’s three-step sliding scale equal protection test – 
weighing the importance of the individual right, the importance of the government 
purpose, and the means employed to further that purpose986 – the supreme court held that 
an economic interest in death benefits is entitled only to minimum protection and is 
outweighed by the state’s interest in providing a quick, efficient, fair, and predictable 
system of compensation.987  The supreme court upheld the denial of death benefits and 
affirmed the decisions of the compensation board and the superior court.988 
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Reust v. Alaska Petroleum Contractors, Inc.  
In Reust v. Alaska Petroleum Contractors, Inc.,989 the supreme court held that an 
employee was wrongfully terminated for testifying in previous litigation involving his 
employer.990  Reust sued Alaska Petroleum Contractors (“APC”) for wrongful 
termination when he was fired for having participated in previous litigation involving 
APC.991  A jury found for Reust, awarding compensatory damages, including lost wages, 
and punitive damages.992  Both parties appealed.993  The supreme court held that the 
superior court’s jury instructions, which failed to list consideration as an element of 
contract formation, did not affect the jury’s finding that APC had hired Reust.994  The 
court also found that discharging Reust was contrary to public policy.995  However, the 
court elaborated that the lost wages award was for too long of a period.996  The court also 
rejected Reust’s claims that the punitive damages cap was unconstitutional,997 but found 
that the lower court applied the wrong cap.998  Finally, the court found that the State was 
allowed to intervene and thereby receive half of the punitive damage award.999  The 
supreme court remanded the case for reduction of the award of lost wages, application of 
a new punitive damages cap, and review of the recalculated punitive damages award for 
excessiveness, but affirmed the remainder of the superior court’s decision.1000 
 
 
State, Public Employees’ Retirement Board v. Morton 
In State, Public Employees’ Retirement Board v. Morton,1001 the supreme court 
held that an employee was entitled to receive benefits for an occupational disability when 
he could not return to public employment, even though he obtained a new job that paid 
more than his old salary.1002  Morton received occupational disability benefits when he 
was injured in the course of his employment with the Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (“PERS”).1003  When Morton found a new job outside of PERS, the Retirement 
Board cancelled his benefits pursuant to the “75% rule.”1004  This was an unwritten policy 
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that stated that an employee was not eligible for benefits if he earned outside income of 
more than 75% of his previous salary.1005  The superior court reversed the Board’s 
termination of Morton’s benefits, and the Board appealed.1006  The supreme court held 
that the 75% rule was contrary to relevant Alaska statutes and that a person who was 
unable to perform a PERS job, yet willing to perform another job, was still within the 
definition of occupational disability.1007  The supreme court therefore affirmed the 
superior court’s holding.1008 
 
 
Municipality of Anchorage v. Devon 
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Devon,1009 the supreme court held that the Alaska 
Workers’ Compensation Board (“AWCB”) properly denied an employer’s petition for 
reimbursement of benefits when a physician’s testimony provided substantial evidence 
that a worker did not misrepresent his condition.1010  Devon suffered injuries in the 
course of his employment with the Municipality of Anchorage and was awarded workers’ 
compensation benefits.1011  The Municipality sought reimbursement for benefits paid to 
Devon based on video surveillance of Devon engaging in activities inconsistent with his 
injury claims.1012  The AWCB found in favor of Devon, relying on a physician’s 
testimony that the videotaped activities were not inconsistent with Devon’s claims.1013  
The municipality appealed, and the superior court affirmed.1014  On appeal, the supreme 
court deferred to the AWCB’s determination of witness credibility with respect to the 
physician’s testimony.1015  Thus, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s holding 
that there was substantial evidence that Devon did not file his claims fraudulently.1016 
 
 
Scammon Bay Ass’n v. Ulak 
In Scammon Bay Ass’n v. Ulak,1017 the supreme court held that a motion to 
intervene by an employer filed the day before a hearing was timely.1018  Ulak was injured 
at work and received workers’ compensation benefits.1019  Normally an employer may 
place a lien on any money the employee receives from third-party tortfeasors to recover 
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those benefits.1020  Ulak reached an agreement with the third-party tortfeasors that 
assigned some fault to his employer, which could have affected the employer’s ability to 
recover.1021  In finding the motion timely, the court noted that the employer was notified 
of the hearing only twelve days before the hearing to finalize the agreement.1022  Further, 
the prejudice to the other parties was small,1023 and if the motion had been denied the 
employer could have lost its lien.1024  The court held that the motion was timely and 
remanded the matter to the superior court.1025 
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X.  ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
 
Ninth Circuit  
 
Alaska Trojan Partnership v. Gutierrez  
In Alaska Trojan Partnership v. Gutierrez,1026 the Ninth Circuit held that the 
owner of a crabbing vessel was improperly denied a brown king crab endorsement.1027  
The National Marine Fisheries Service denied an endorsement because it was determined 
that Alaska Trojan made only two “documented harvests” during the endorsement 
qualification period.1028  Alaska Trojan filed suit claiming it made three “documented 
harvests” and was entitled to the endorsement.1029  The district court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants and Alaska Trojan appealed.1030  The Ninth Circuit held that 
the agency’s interpretation of “documented harvest” was inconsistent with both the plain 
meaning of the statute and the intent of the license limitation program that authorized the 
endorsements.1031  The court went on to say that “there is no reasonable interpretation [of 
the statute] that would deny Alaska Trojan” an endorsement.1032  The case was remanded 
with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Alaska Trojan.1033 
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XI.  ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
In re Hanlon 
In In re Hanlon,1034 the supreme court held that an attorney’s cooperation with the 
disciplinary committee and the negative effects of suspension on the attorney’s practice 
and family do not mitigate misconduct.1035  One of Hanlon’s clients filed a grievance that 
he neglected her claim.1036  To avoid a malpractice claim, Hanlon fabricated a settlement 
agreement and paid the client out of his own funds.1037  In response to a subsequent 
inquiry from the Alaska Bar Association, Hanlon falsely indicated that the client’s case 
had reached a settlement.1038  The Board of Governors recommended that Hanlon be 
suspended for three years, and Hanlon appealed the recommendation.1039  The supreme 
court found that Hanlon only cooperated with the disciplinary proceedings after his 
deceitful actions were caught by the bar; therefore, it was not considered a mitigating 
factor.1040  Also, the supreme court held that the effects of a penalty on an attorney’s 
practice or family life are not mitigating factors because giving too much weight to these 
considerations would not serve the overall purpose of disciplining attorneys, which is to 
protect the public.1041  Hence, the supreme court suspended Hanlon for three years.1042 
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XII.  FAMILY LAW 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Silvan v. Alcina 
In Silvan v. Alcina,1043 the supreme court held in a divorce proceeding that if the 
mother moved outside of Alaska, the best interests of the children would require that the 
father gain primary custody.1044  Silvan, the mother, wanted to divorce Alcina, the father, 
and move to Arizona.1045  The superior court granted Silvan shared custody of the 
children with Alcina but stipulated that if Silvan moved to Arizona, it would be in the 
best interest of the children for them to stay with Alcina in Alaska.1046  The supreme 
court affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that Alcina was more willing to 
promote an open custodial relationship with the other parent and it was appropriate for 
the superior court to weigh this fact in its decision.1047  Thus, while Silvan would have 
shared custody if she stayed in Alaska, a move outside of the state would give Alcina 
primary custody based on the bests interests of the children.1048  
 
 
Caldwell v. State, Department of Revenue 
 In Caldwell v. State, Department of Revenue,1049 the supreme court held that 
proceeds from a husband’s sale of stock could not be treated as multi-year income for the 
determination of child support.1050  Caldwell sold his stock in a company and signed a 
five-year non-compete agreement.1051  The superior court accepted the Child Support 
Enforcement Division’s claim that proceeds from the sale of stock were compensation for 
the non-compete agreement and therefore qualified as income for child support 
purposes.1052  Caldwell appealed, claiming the proceeds were not compensation for the 
non-compete agreement, but rather payments for the sale of an asset.1053  The supreme 
court held that, because Caldwell was a minority shareholder who could not halt the sale 
nor refuse to sign the non-compete agreement, it was improper to view the proceeds as 
payment for the agreement.1054  The supreme court thus reversed the child support order 
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and remanded for further findings, holding that the proceeds from sale of stock could not 
be considered income for child support purposes.1055 
 
 
McComas v. Kirn 
 In McComas v. Kirn,1056 the supreme held a domestic violence protective order 
was proper where an ex-husband had committed a crime involving domestic violence 
against his ex-wife, the actions supporting his ex-wife’s petition for a long-term 
protective order were not too remote in time, and the order was not barred by denial of an 
earlier request for a protective order.1057  Kirn obtained a protective order against her 
husband, McComas, who was incarcerated, but the order was rescinded by the divorce 
settlement with the condition that McComas refrain from contacting Kirn directly.1058  
One week before McComas was to be released from custody, the superior court heard 
and granted Kirn’s petition for a long-term protective order from which McComas 
appealed.1059  The supreme court held that the superior court did not clearly err in finding 
that McComas committed multiple acts of domestic violence through vandalizing his 
former mother-in-law’s car, sending threatening letters to Kirn while incarcerated, and 
expressing a desire that she would suffer harm.1060  The supreme court held that because 
the last of the threats occurred only a few months prior to Kirn’s petition, the threats were 
not too remote in time.1061  Finally the court held that the long-term protective order was 
not barred by the divorce because it served as an additional safeguard for Kirn.1062  The 
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision to issue a long-term protective 
order, holding that the ex-husband had committed a crime involving domestic violence, 
the actions were not too remote in time, and the order was not barred by the prior divorce 
settlement.1063  
 
 
Miller v. Miller 
In Miller v. Miller,1064 the supreme court held that a marital home and a cash gift 
given to a husband by his mother were marital property and that the husband was 
responsible for a portion of the wife's attorneys’ fees during divorce proceedings.1065  The 
disputed marital property included a house in which the couple lived until they separated 
and a cash gift initially invested in a personal account, but subsequently transferred to a 
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joint checking account, both of which were given to Chad by his mother.1066  Chad 
appealed the superior court’s holding that these items were marital property and its award 
of attorneys’ fees.1067  The supreme court found that because both parties shared the 
house and both contributed to its maintenance, the superior court’s determination that the 
house was marital property was not clearly erroneous.1068  Similarly, the court found that 
the superior court's finding that the money became marital property when Chad 
transferred it from a personal account to a joint account was not clearly erroneous.1069  
Moreover, the superior court correctly valued the estate.1070  Finally, the superior court 
had broad discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees based on the relative economic situations 
of the parties in divorce proceedings.1071  Thus, the supreme court affirmed the superior 
courts’ findings that the marital home and cash gift were marital property, its valuation of 
the marital estate, and its award of attorneys’ fees.1072 
 
 
McGrew v. State 
In McGrew v. State,1073 the supreme court held that during child-in-need-of-aid 
(“CINA”) proceedings, the Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services (“DFYS”) 
owed a duty of care only to the child involved in the proceedings and not relatives, 
including parents or grandparents.1074  The McGrews were grandparents to Lucy M., who 
was orphaned when her parents and sibling were killed; DFYS took custody via CINA 
proceedings and ultimately placed her in the custody of a family friend.1075  The 
McGrews claimed that DFYS failed to provide the McGrews with information on their 
granddaughter’s placement, that DFYS failed to inform the court of their interest in 
custody of Lucy, and that DFYS did not tell the court that the family friend with whom 
Lucy M. was placed had a criminal history.1076  The McGrews asserted claims against 
DFYS of negligence and failure to abide by the Alaska Constitution, various state 
provisions, and DFYS internal policies.1077  They also claimed intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (“IIED”).1078  DFYS moved for dismissal of the entire action, and the 
superior court dismissed all three counts.1079  The supreme court affirmed the dismissal of 
the negligence claim and the constitutional claim because the state did not owe the 
                                                
1066  Id. 
1067  Id.  
1068  Id. at 1141. 
1069  Id. at 1142. 
1070  Id. at 1144. 
1071 Id.  
1072 Id. at 1139. 
1073 106 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2005). 
1074 Id. at 320. 
1075 Id. at 320–21 
1076 Id. at 321. 
1077 Id.   
1078 Id. 
1079 Id.  
 81 
grandparents an actionable duty and alternative remedies were available.1080  The court 
further held that an IIED claim by relatives who were a party to a CINA proceeding was 
not precluded by the absence of a duty of care.1081  Thus, the court reversed and 
remanded the IIED claim, holding that a duty of care was not an essential element of 
IIED.1082   
 
 
Alden v. Children’s Services 
In Alden v. Children’s Services,1083 the supreme court held that it was not plain 
error to enforce a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights when there was no abuse of 
discretion denying contact with the children,1084 nor in rejecting claims that the 
relinquishment was conditional.1085  Alden executed a voluntary relinquishment of his 
parental rights that, he argues, was conditional upon the successful placement of his 
children with an adoptive parent and allowed him to maintain contact with his 
children.1086  The adoption of Alden’s children failed, and the children were placed in 
foster care.1087  Alden then asked the superior court to withdraw the relinquishment 
because the condition of a successful adoption had not been met.1088  Alden also 
requested withdrawal of the relinquishment pursuant to Rita T. v. State1089, which held 
that parental rights that have been involuntarily terminated may be reinstated upon a 
showing that the parent has overcome the problems that lead to the termination.1090  On 
appeal from a denial of his claim, Alden added a claim that the relinquishment itself was 
invalid because Alaska law does not provide for conditional or partial voluntary 
relinquishment.1091  Because this claim was not raised at trial, the supreme court applied a 
plain error standard of review and affirmed the superior court’s determination that the 
relinquishment was nevertheless neither partial nor conditional.1092  The supreme court 
applied an abuse of discretion standard to find no error in denying Alden contact with his 
children.1093  The supreme court declined to determine whether a Rita T. claim is 
applicable to a voluntary relinquishment, and instead found that the superior court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding Alden failed to show good cause to withdraw the 
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relinquishment.1094  The supreme court found no plain error nor abuse of discretion in 
Alden’s claims and affirmed the superior court’s disposition of the case.1095 
 
 
Martin v. Dieringer 
 In Martin v. Dieringer,1096 the supreme court held that the trial court clearly erred 
when it found that a loan to a personal representative from an estate was an arm’s length 
transaction causing no harm, that proceeds from a life insurance policy were owned by a 
personal representative and not the trustor’s children, and that a personal representative 
did not breach his fiduciary duty.1097  James Dieringer was the personal representative of 
an estate left in trust by Martin to his children.1098  During that time, Dieringer made a 
below-market interest rate loan from the estate to a company in which he was a 
partner1099 and threatened to charge estate fees when Martin’s son refused to sell him 
estate property at a below-market price.1100  The court held that these self-dealing actions 
detrimentally affected the estate value and constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.1101  
Furthermore, Dieringer claimed that Martin’s $50,000 life insurance policy had been left 
to Dieringer individually rather than as a trustee.1102  Because there was no indication that 
the gift was intended for Dieringer personally, it was erroneous for the trial court to find 
that Dieringer loaned the estate $50,000 for which he could later claim 
reimbursement.1103  Thus, the supreme court vacated the trial court’s findings that 
Dieringer caused no harm to the estate, personally owned a life insurance policy intended 
for the estate, and did not violate his fiduciary duty.1104  The court remanded for a 
reconsideration of attorneys’ fees and fees of the personal representative.1105 
 
 
Lana C. v. Cameron P. 
 In Lana C. v. Cameron P.,1106 the supreme court held that a non-disclosure order 
prohibiting an individual in a domestic violence proceeding from presenting relevant 
evidence is contrary to public policy and void.1107  Lana C. was held in contempt by the 
superior court for violating a non-disclosure order that prevented her from discussing 
allegations of child abuse committed by her ex-husband, Cameron P., against their 
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daughter.1108  The superior court also awarded Cameron costs and attorneys’ fees and 
prohibited Lana from making any future accusations against Cameron regarding child 
abuse.1109  Lana appealed.1110  The supreme court held that a private agreement that 
prevents an individual from presenting relevant evidence in a domestic violence hearing 
is unenforceable because public policy mandates that individuals be allowed to provide 
evidence relevant to litigation and investigation.1111  The supreme court thus reversed the 
superior court’s finding of contempt, vacated the non-disclosure order, and remanded to 
afford Lana an opportunity to recoup her costs and attorneys’ fees.1112 
 
 
Chase v. Chase 
In Chase v. Chase,1113 the supreme court held that the trial court acted within its 
discretion both in awarding sole custody of a couple’s son to the mother and in finding 
certain property to be marital property.1114  Judy and Ernest Chase began living together 
in 1986, had three children, and later married.1115  A decree of divorce was issued in 
2004, in which the superior court awarded primary custody of their youngest child to 
Judy contrary to the recommendations of a state custody investigator’s report.1116  In 
addition, the superior court found that certain property, purportedly purchased before the 
marriage was marital property.1117  Noting that the superior court is under no obligation 
to adopt a custody investigator’s recommendations,1118 the supreme court held that the 
superior court adequately weighed statutory factors in determining custody and affirmed 
its holding.1119   The supreme court affirmed, holding that property may be considered 
marital property if it is acquired during any period of premarital cohabitation eventually 
resulting in marriage or if it may be shown that the parties intended to treat the property 
as marital through actions such as joint residence, ownership or maintenance.1120 The 
court further held that the superior court’s designation of the property as marital was 
sufficiently supported by the record.1121  
 
 
                                                
1108 Id. at 899. 
1109 Id. at 900. 
1110 Id.  
1111 Id. at 901–02. 
1112 Id. at 903. 
1113 109 P.3d 942 (Alaska 2005). 
1114 Id. at 943. 
1115 Id. 
1116 Id. at 944. 
1117 Id. at 947. 
1118 Id. at 945. 
1119 Id. at 947. 
1120 Id. at 947–48. 
1121 Id. at 947. 
 84 
Rick P. v. State 
In Rick P. v. State,1122 the supreme court held that a father’s parental rights over 
his two children were properly terminated.1123  Rick had left his son Dylan with multiple 
caregivers and committed domestic violence against his girlfriend.1124  The State 
subsequently removed Dylan from Rick’s custody.1125  Rick also made few contacts with 
his daughter, Diane, both before and after paternity tests confirmed he was her biological 
father.1126  The superior court issued separate orders terminating Rick’s rights to both 
Dylan and Diane,1127 and Rick appealed.1128  The supreme court upheld the superior 
court’s orders terminating Rick’s parental rights, holding that Rick’s domestic violence 
and other behaviors caused mental injury to Dylan resulting in Dylan’s aggressive 
behaviors and that Rick’s attendance at counseling sessions was insufficient to remedy 
the problem.1129  The supreme court also upheld termination of parental rights over 
Diane, holding that Rick abandoned her and did not remedy his abandonment within 
reasonable time.1130  The supreme court thus affirmed termination of parental rights over 
both children.1131 
 
 
Veselsky v. Veselsky 
 In Veselsky v. Veselsky,1132 the supreme court held that a mother was entitled to 
retain primary physical custody of children after moving to another state,1133 that a 
mother’s student loan was properly included as a marital debt in the division of property 
upon divorce,1134 and that a father was properly ordered to pay seventy-five percent of 
costs for visitation and medical expenses.1135  Bernard and Patricia Veselsky shared 
custody of their children until Patricia planned to move to Minnesota with her children 
and sued for full custody.1136  Bernard appealed the decisions of the trial court to grant 
both primary custody of the children and an unequal division of property to Patricia.1137  
The supreme court allowed primary custody to Patricia under the best interests of the 
child standard, considering factors including:  legitimate reasons for the mother’s move, 
ability to meet the children’s needs, household stability, and the maintenance of a close 
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relationship with the non-custodial parent.1138  The supreme court allowed an unequal 
distribution of marital property because Patricia’s student loan was obtained during the 
marriage and must applied as joint debt and because her unemployment while she 
pursued her degree is a substantial income disparity.1139  The supreme court affirmed the 
decisions of the trial court both in granting full custody to Patricia and in awarding 
unequal property division.1140 
 
 
Ebertz v. Ebertz 
In Ebertz v. Ebertz,1141 the supreme court held that the superior court did not err in 
awarding sole custody of two children to a mother and shared custody of a third child to 
both parents.1142  After a custody hearing, the superior court granted custody of two of 
Denise Bahma-Ebertz and Peter Ebertz’s children to Denise and granted shared custody 
of their third child to both of them.1143  The supreme court ruled that the superior court 
adequately addressed the statutory factors for determining the children’s best interests1144 
and that the record supported the superior court’s decision.1145  The supreme court also 
held that the superior court properly rejected the custody investigator’s recommendations 
because the court properly relied on other evidence.1146  The supreme court affirmed , 
holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion and its findings were not 
clearly erroneous.1147 
 
 
Ray v. Ray 
In Ray v. Ray,1148 the supreme court held that the superior court had jurisdiction to 
require a father to pay child support for an illegitimate son for whom he had previously 
agreed to pay support.1149  During divorce proceedings, James Ray established that he 
was not the biological father of C.R.1150  After the divorce proceedings, however, James 
voluntarily filed documents with the court listing C.R. as his child and filed a motion 
seeking monthly payments for his support obligations.1151  The superior court then 
entered an order requiring James to pay child support for C.R.1152  Later, James filed a 
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motion claiming that the support order was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
and sought retroactive relief.1153  The supreme court affirmed the denial of retroactive 
relief, holding that the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the support 
order because the documents filed by James could be interpreted as an agreement to pay 
child support regardless of paternity.1154 
 
 
Andrea v. David 
 In Andrea v. David,1155 the supreme court held that the superior court erred by 
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before placing a child in an uncle’s home when the 
custody decree granted the father physical custody.1156  The divorce decree between 
Andrea and David granted physical custody of all four children to David.1157  However, 
two of their children were placed in separate homes indefinitely, and one child was 
subsequently placed in an uncle’s home over Andrea’s objections.1158  The supreme court 
reasoned that, because the order had withdrawn the right of physical custody of one of the 
children from the person granted custody, the order had modified the original custody 
decree.1159  Holding that an evidentiary hearing is required any time a custody decree is 
modified over the objection of a parent, the supreme court vacated the order and ordered 
a hearing.1160 
 
 
Jeff A.C. v. State 
In Jeff A.C. v. State,1161 the supreme court held that the due process clause of the 
Alaska Constitution does not grant a parent an absolute entitlement to participate in an 
adjudication hearing prior to a hearing to terminate parental rights.1162  The superior court 
adjudicated Jeff C.’s daughter as a child in need of aid (“CINA”) with the mother and 
putative father present.1163  A paternity test later revealed Jeff to be the father.1164  The 
state then moved to terminate the mother’s and Jeff’s parental rights, and the superior 
court ruled against Jeff.1165  The supreme court held that Jeff’s right to procedural due 
process was not violated by his exclusion from the adjudication hearing.1166  The court 
reasoned that the focus of CINA adjudication is the child, while the focus in a termination 
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proceeding is the parents’ actions.1167  Furthermore, the state did not fail to fulfill its 
notice requirement for the CINA adjudication because Jeff could not be “found after 
diligent efforts.”1168  The court also upheld the superior court’s finding that other 
requirements for termination were met.1169  Thus, the supreme court affirmed the superior 
court’s termination of Jeff’s parental rights,1170 holding that parents do not have an 
absolute right to participate in an adjudication hearing before a termination hearing.1171 
 
 
Alyssa v. State, Department of Health and Social Services 
In Alyssa v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,1172 the supreme 
court held that a mother was not entitled to a jury trial in child in need of aid (“CINA”) 
proceedings and the mother could be required to undergo a pre-adjudication 
psychological evaluation.1173  The superior court denied Alyssa’s request for a jury trial 
in proceedings to adjudicate whether her daughter was a CINA.1174  The superior court 
also ordered that Alyssa undergo a pre-adjudication psychological evaluation.1175  The 
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s denial of Alyssa’s request for a jury trial 
because child protection cases have historically been treated as matters of equity in 
Alaska.1176  Additionally, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s order for 
Alyssa’s pre-adjudication psychological evaluation because Alyssa’s mental condition 
was in controversy and there was sufficient evidence to establish good cause for a 
psychological evaluation.1177  
 
 
Elton H. v. Naomi R. 
In Elton H. v. Naomi R.,1178 the supreme court held that the factual findings 
required by Evans v. McTaggart1179 for awarding custody to a non-parent applied to a 
grant of shared physical custody of two children to their father and grandmother and that 
a four-condition test applied in awarding custody to a non-party.1180  After Elton and 
Naomi separated, Naomi’s mother, Arletta, helped raise their two children.1181  In Elton’s 
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suit for custody, from which Arletta was dismissed,1182 the superior court awarded sole 
legal custody to Naomi but shared physical custody to Arletta and Elton.1183  Elton 
appealed, arguing that the superior court: 1) violated the Evans requirement of certain 
factual findings before awarding custody to a non-parent,1184 2) abused its discretion in 
awarding legal custody to Naomi,1185 and 3) improperly awarded custody to a non-party, 
Arletta.1186  The supreme court held that: 1) awarding shared physical custody to a non-
parent over a parent’s objections required the Evans finding of clear and convincing 
evidence that the parent is unfit or that the child’s welfare requires non-parental custody, 
which the superior court did not make;1187 2) the superior court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting Naomi legal custody because Naomi’s inability to parent was based 
on only temporary problems;1188 and 3) a trial court may grant custody to a non-party 
only if a) the non-party consents, b) the order complies with Evans, c) the non-party 
would have been entitled to intervene, and d) the parties had fair notice of the possibility 
of such award.1189  The supreme court affirmed legal custody to Naomi, reversed the 
order of shared physical custody, and remanded, holding that the Evans requirement 
applied to orders of physical custody and that custody may be granted to a non-party only 
if the four conditions are met.1190 
 
 
 
Abood v. Abood 
In Abood v. Abood,1191 the supreme court held that the trial court properly found 
that a personal injury settlement was a wife’s separate property, that a home purchased by 
the husband prior to the marriage was marital property, that the appreciation of the 
husband’s business was marital property, that a federal income tax return was his separate 
property, and the value of a car traded in by the wife was properly determined.1192  
Patrick and Kimberly Abood divorced, and the superior court divided their property.1193  
Both appealed the division of property.1194  The supreme court that Kimberly’s personal 
injury settlement was her separate property even though it was deposited in a joint 
account because of the personal nature of the settlement and its intended purpose to 
provide for her future medical needs.1195  The court also held that the house Patrick had 
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purchased prior to the marriage was joint property because the house had served as the 
marital home and both had contributed to its care and upkeep.1196  The court ruled that the 
appreciation in Patrick’s business was joint property because it resulted from marital 
contributions of time and money.1197  The supreme court also held that the superior court 
did not err in finding the income tax refund was Patrick’s separate property because the 
reduction of liability was the result of his contribution of separate funds.1198  Finally, the 
supreme court held that the superior court properly valued the car Kimberly traded in by 
using the Blue Book value at the time of trial.1199  Therefore, the supreme court affirmed 
the superior court’s division of property with respect to the personal injury settlement, the 
marital home, the business appreciation, and the tax refund.1200 
 
 
Hansen v. Hansen 
 In Hansen v. Hansen,1201 the supreme court held that a valuation of a husband’s 
corporation and primary residence were correct, there was no need to grant any post-
separation payments, and any accounts funded either fully or at least in part by premarital 
assets were not wholly marital assets.1202  Karl and Mada Hansen lived together for 
nearly two years after filing for divorce.1203  The superior court divided the assets in 
Mada’s favor.1204  The superior court held that the corporation was properly valued 
according to valuation of goodwill.1205  The supreme court affirmed, holding that the 
superior court correctly valuated the marital residence by valuing it within the range 
presented by experts in the trial.1206  The supreme court held that post-separation 
payments need not be awarded because the couple continued to live as a marital unit after 
separation.1207  The supreme court held that retirement accounts held by Karl were not 
marital property because the majority of funds in the accounts were premarital and there 
was no showing of intent to transmute these accounts into marital property.1208  Finally, 
the supreme court held that Mada’s health insurance benefit was in part a marital asset 
because marital funds were partially used to fund the account.1209  The supreme court 
reversed the property division with respect to Karl’s retirement accounts, vacated in 
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regard to Mada’s health insurance benefit, remanded in regard to those property issues, 
and affirmed as to all other respects.1210 
 
 
State, Department of Revenue v. Wallace 
In State, Department of Revenue v. Wallace,1211 the supreme court held that the 
Child Support Services Division (“CSSD”) may collect back child support payments if it 
does not attempt to modify a pre-existing order for child support payments.1212  Wallace 
was ordered to pay fifty dollars a month in child support while in prison.1213  The order 
stated that the payments would increase after his release, but the CSSD did not to try to 
increase his payments until seven years after his release.1214  The superior court ruled that 
the payments could not be increased retroactively,1215 but the supreme court found that 
the original order terminated upon Wallace’s release from prison.1216  Since no order 
covered the period after Wallace’s release, the supreme court ruled that the CSSD was 
not precluded from seeking higher payments for that period.1217  The supreme court 
reversed the superior court’s decision, holding that, although the CSSD may not 
retroactively modify a pre-existing order, it is not prevented from seeking back payments 
for periods not covered by an order.1218 
 
 
Webb v. State, Department of Revenue  
In Webb v. State, Department of Revenue,1219 the supreme court held that a father 
could not claim that his ex-wife was precluded from collecting child support payments 
during the time when the children were in the custody of a third party.1220  Gary Webb 
did not pay child support for the eight years during which one or both of his daughters 
were out of the custody of Key, their mother.1221  After the children returned to Key, 
Gary moved to modify the amount of arrears he owed, claiming that Key was precluded 
from collecting payments from this time.1222  The superior court denied the motion, and 
Gary appealed.1223  The supreme court held that the rule precluding arrearages when the 
obligor exercises primary custody of the children could not be construed to allow 
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preclusion when the children were in the custody of a third party.1224  The court reasoned 
that neither the plain language nor the policy of the statute supported this 
interpretation.1225  The court also reasoned that Webb could have sought modification of 
the order when the children were out of their mother’s custody, but retroactive preclusion 
was impermissible.1226  The supreme court affirmed the judgment, holding that Webb 
could not claim preclusion of the child support payments because he did not have 
physical custody of the children.1227 
 
 
State, Department of Revenue v. Wise 
 In State, Department of Revenue v. Wise,1228 the supreme court found an 
administrative delay of nine months to be insufficient reason to change a presumptive 
effective date for modification of a child support order.1229  Wise was served with a 
Notice of Petition for Modification of Judicial Support Order after the mother of his child 
applied for increased child support.1230  The complete review of Wise’s file took nine 
months.1231  The superior court cited this delay as reason to change the effective date of 
the modification.1232  The supreme court reversed, stating that the presumed effective date 
for modification orders is the date of the initial Notice.1233  Although the superior court 
may alter the effective date when it has good cause, a delay of nine months was not good 
cause here.1234  The supreme court thus reversed the superior court’s decision, holding 
that it had abused its discretion in changing the presumptive effective date based merely 
on the length of the administrative review.1235 
 
 
Killary v. Killary 
 In Killary v. Killary,1236 the supreme court held that a parent is not entitled to 
child support payments when the child is no longer living with the parent unless there is a 
factual showing that the parent incurred justifiable expenses relating to the child.1237  
After Clifford and Susan Killary divorced, Susan was given primary physical custody of 
their daughter Megan, and Clifford paid child support.1238  Megan ran away from home 
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after the trial court denied Clifford’s motions to modify the custody arrangement, but 
Clifford was still obligated by a superior court order to pay child support.1239  Clifford 
appealed his child support obligation on the grounds that Susan was no longer in physical 
custody of Megan and no longer was supporting her financially.1240  The supreme court 
held that because child support should accurately reflect the responsibilities of the 
parents, Clifford’s continuing support would only be justified based on a factual showing 
that Susan was spending money to find Megan and to maintain a suitable residence for 
her should she return.1241  Therefore, the supreme court held that Clifford’s child support 
obligation should not have been reinstated without a factual determination of Susan’s 
expenditures, and it vacated the superior court’s child support order and remanded the 
case for the necessary factual determination.1242 
 
 
Hixson v. Sarkesian 
In Hixson v. Sarkesian,1243 the supreme court held that an exchange-rate 
fluctuation is not income for the purposes of determining whether a material change in 
circumstances has occurred when determining child support payments.1244  Sarkesian 
lived in Switzerland and was paid in Swiss Francs.1245  Hixson moved to modify 
Sarkesian’s child support, contending that exchange rate fluctuations altered Sarkesian’s 
child support obligation by over fifteen percent—the threshold for a presumption of 
material change in circumstances.1246  The superior court, in denying the motion held that 
the change was lower than the fifteen percent threshold.1247  The supreme court reversed 
and remanded, holding that child support payments must be calculated consistently and, 
per the settlement agreement, be based on the applicable percentage of income in dollar 
terms.1248 
 
 
Hanson v. Hanson 
In Hanson v. Hanson,1249 the supreme court held that in a divorce proceeding, 
increases in a business’s value were marital property and that an award of interim support 
and attorneys’ fees may offset a spouse’s share of the marital estate.1250  Hans Manson 
acquired a company before the marriage to Michelle and subsequently allocated five 
                                                
1239 Id. at 1040–41. 
1240 Id. at 1041. 
1241 Id. at 1041–42. 
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percent to her.1251  The superior court held that this company was Hans’ separate 
property.1252  On appeal, the supreme court held that the doctrine of active appreciation , 
under which increases in value of a business resulting from marital conduct was marital 
property if 1) the property appreciated during marriage; 2) parties made marital 
contributions; and (3) the contributions caused the appreciation.1253  The court held that 
there was evidence that the company in dispute satisfied all three, and therefore the court 
remanded for findings under the doctrine.1254  The supreme court thus reversed the 
superior court’s decision that the business was separate property.1255 
 
 
Bartlett v. State, Department of Revenue 
 In Bartlett v. State, Department of Revenue,1256 the supreme court held that due to 
the exceptions to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, when a state that has issued an order 
in a child support registration proceeding retains jurisdiction, an order from another state 
does not have preclusive effect.1257  Bartlett, a former Alaska resident, was ordered to pay 
child support.1258  After his obligations had ended, the Child Support Enforcement 
Division still sought back payments from him by registering his obligation in Arizona, 
where Bartlett said he lived.1259  The Arizona court denied the registration order because 
he was not properly served when the division sent mail to him at his Michigan 
address.1260  The Alaska Superior Court vacated the support order, and Bartlett’s ex-wife 
appealed.1261  The supreme court held that an exception to the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel, based on the limited scope of a decision and the limited jurisdiction of a court, 
applies to child support registration cases.1262  The court reasoned that responding states 
cannot modify child support orders of issuing states if a party continues to reside in the 
issuing state.1263  The supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that the Arizona 
court’s determination that Bartlett was not properly served should not be given issue 
preclusive effect.1264 
 
 
 
                                                
1251 Id. at 302. 
1252 Id. at 303.   
1253 Id at 304. 
1254 Id. at 304-06. 
1255  Id. at 310. 
1256 125 P.3d 328 (Alaska 2005). 
1257 Id. at 329. 
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XIII.  IMMIGRATION LAW 
 
Ninth Circuit  
 
United States v. Zavala-Mendez  
In United States v. Zavala-Mendez,1265 the Ninth Circuit held that an alien who 
proceeds directly to a border station in the manner designated by the government and 
presents himself to authorities cannot be convicted of being “found in” the United 
States.1266  Zavala-Mendez was convicted of being “found in” the United States when he 
tried to enter Alaska at a border crossing in a car after having previously been 
deported.1267  He appealed.1268  The Ninth Circuit held that “found” implies that the alien 
was discovered by someone else and did not voluntarily present himself.1269  The court 
reasoned that an alien, who crosses the border, proceeds along the designated path from 
the border to the customs inspection station, and presents himself to the authorities, is 
analogous to an alien who disembarks from an airplane and proceeds to the inspection 
counter; such aliens have not been “found in” the United States.1270  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed, holding that an alien who proceeds in a designated manner to a border station 
and presents himself to authorities cannot be convicted of being “found in” the United 
States.1271 
 
                                                
1265 411 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2005). 
1266 Id. at 1121. 
1267 Id. at 1117. 
1268 Id. at 1118. 
1269 Id. at 1119. 
1270 Id. at 1119–21 
1271 Id. at 1121.  
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XIV.  INSURANCE LAW 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Graham-Gonzalez 
In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Graham-Gonzalez,1272 the supreme 
court held that an insurer may offer uninsured and underinsured motorists (“UIM”) 
coverage without stating the differences in cost between levels of UIM coverage in the 
application form.1273  Graham-Gonzalez was seriously injured in a car collision; her 
insurance company, Government Employees’ Insurance Company (“GEICO”), paid the 
full UIM policy limits.1274  Graham-Gonzalez sued GEICO to obtain compensation 
beyond the policy limits, claiming she should have been informed of the relatively 
modest cost in obtaining more UIM coverage.1275  The supreme court reversed, holding 
that GEICO did not violate Alaska law by failing to explain the different costs in varying 
levels of UIM coverage1276 because the relevant statute did not mandate how insurers 
should inform customers of the different costs1277 and because the legislative history only 
suggested insurers must make such differences in prices available and give customers 
notice of their availability.1278   
 
 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Dowdy 
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Dowdy,1279 the supreme court 
held that questions relating to the types of claims covered by an insurance policy were 
beyond the scope of an arbitration clause regarding fault and liability.1280  Dowdy sought 
to compel arbitration on the question of whether separate coverage limits applied to 
different claims arising from an automobile accident.1281  Although the insurance policy 
only provided for arbitration on the questions of fault and liability, Dowdy claimed that 
the issue of coverage is inextricably intertwined with those questions.1282  Reasoning by 
analogy to case law concerning arbitration clauses in business contracts, the supreme 
court held that an otherwise nonabitrable matter is inextricably intertwined with an 
arbitrable matter, and therefore capable of being committed to arbitration, when findings 
on the matter committed to arbitration would decide the otherwise nonarbitrable 
                                                
1272 107 P.3d 279 (Alaska 2005). 
1273 Id. at 280–81.  
1274 Id. at 281. 
1275 Id. at 281–82. 
1276 Id. at 284. 
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question.1283  Because an arbitrator’s determination of fault and liability would not 
necessarily resolve questions of coverage, the matters were not inextricably 
intertwined.1284  The supreme court held that an insurance policy clause providing for 
arbitration of matters of fault and liability did not extend to the question of which claims 
are covered by the policy.1285 
 
 
Dugan v. Atlanta Casualty Companies 
In Dugan v. Atlanta Casualty Companies,1286 the supreme court held that an 
automobile insurance policy did not cover relatives of the insured who are not residents 
of the insured’s household.1287  Dugan attempted to collect for his automobile-related 
injuries as a covered person under his son’s automobile insurance policy with Atlanta 
Casualty Companies, which claimed that Dugan was not covered.1288  The superior court 
held that the policy required claimants to reside in the policyholder’s household and that 
Dugan was not a resident in his son’s household.1289  Dugan appealed, arguing that the 
policy’s residency provision was ambiguous and should be interpreted against the insurer 
and that the superior court incorrectly applied the reasonable expectations test—or 
whether the insured reasonably expected that a claimant is a resident in his household—
in determining that he was not a resident in his son’s household.1290  The supreme court 
held that ambiguity is determined by looking to the parties’ reasonable expectations, 
which are discerned from: 1) language of the disputed provision, 2) language of other 
provisions, 3) relevant extrinsic evidence, and 4) case law on similar provisions.1291  The 
court also held that Dugan’s interpretation of the policy was not reasonable and that 
therefore the residency requirement was not ambiguous.1292  The supreme court also held 
that the superior court correctly applied the reasonable expectations test.1293  The supreme 
court thus affirmed judgment in favor of Atlanta Casualty Companies, holding that the 
policy did not cover relatives who were not residents of the insured’s household.1294 
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XV.  NATIVE LAW 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Alaska Inter-Tribal Council v. State 
 In Alaska Inter-Tribal Council v. State,1295 the supreme court held that the 
superior court correctly rejected a group of Alaska Natives’ equal protection claims 
because the Natives did not prove that a de jure discriminatory law enforcement program 
existed and did not prove any discriminatory intent or purpose.1296  The Natives sued the 
state, alleging that Alaska’s allocation of law enforcement services unconstitutionally 
disadvantaged residents of “off-road,” mostly Native, communities.1297  The superior 
court granted summary judgment against the Natives’ federal equal protection claims, 
and the state-based equal protection claims were rejected after a bench trial.1298  The 
supreme court held that the lower court neither erred in finding that the state did not 
adopt the federal government’s pre-statehood de jure race-based law enforcement 
program1299 nor erred in finding that on-road and off-road communities were not 
similarly situated.1300  Finally, the supreme court held that the superior court’s rejection 
of state-based discrimination claims after trial rendered harmless any error in dismissing 
pre-trial identical federal claims because the state constitution provided at least as much 
protection as the federal.1301  Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the superior 
court’s judgment denying the Natives’ equal protection claims.1302 
 
 
In re Adoption of Sara J. 
In In re Adoption of Sara J.,1303 the supreme court held that prevailing social and 
cultural standards do not govern good cause determinations under the Indian Child 
Welfare Act (“ICWA”), but they remain relevant if the good cause inquiry raises 
questions about the suitability of a statutorily preferred placement.1304  Matilda W., a non-
Native, petitioned to adopt three sibling Native children.1305  The superior court granted 
custody for “good cause” over the objections of the children’s extended Native family 
and tribe, who were statutorily preferred under ICWA.1306  They appealed, arguing the 
good cause inquiry must be governed by the Native community’s social and cultural 
                                                
1295 110 P.3d 947 (Alaska 2005). 
1296 Id. at 949. 
1297 Id. at 950. 
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standards.1307  While ICWA gives a preference for child placement with extended family 
or other Natives, a court may deviate from these preferences if there is good cause.1308  
The supreme court held that while prevailing social and cultural standards are necessary 
considerations in the preference inquiry, Congress did not intend to require them in the 
good cause inquiry.1309  The court held that although not controlling, such standards are 
still relevant if a good cause determination implicates a preferred placement.1310  The 
supreme court affirmed, holding that prevailing social and cultural standards do not 
control good cause determinations under ICWA but remain relevant if the inquiry 
implicates preferred placement.1311 
 
 
                                                
1307 Id. at 1020. 
1308 Id. at 1023. 
1309 Id. at 1028. 
1310 Id. at 1029–33. 
1311 Id. at 1020. 
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XVI.  PROPERTY LAW  
 
 
United States Supreme Court  
 
Alaska v. United States 
In Alaska v. United States,1312 the Supreme Court of the United States held that 
Alaska did not have title to two areas of submerged land, one beneath the Alexander 
Archipelago and the other beneath the Glacier Bay.1313  After a Special Master 
recommended summary judgment for the United States, Alaska filed exceptions claiming 
that the Alexander Archipelago waters are either historic inland waters or a juridical bay, 
and, with respect to the lands beneath the Glacier Bay, the United States had not rebutted 
the presumption that Alaska received title at statehood.1314  The Supreme Court held that, 
while states have presumption of title to submerged lands under inland waters,1315 the 
Alexander Archipelago waters were not historic inland waters because Alaska failed to 
show that the United States exercised authority over the area continuously by excluding 
foreign vessels of innocent passage1316 and not a juridical bay because the waters lack 
physical features allowing a mariner to perceive a bay’s limits.1317  The Supreme Court 
also held that the United States has rebutted the presumption that title to submerged lands 
beneath the Glacier Bay passed to Alaska at statehood by showing that it clearly intended 
to set these lands aside for the Glacier Bay National Monument, a federal reservation.1318  
Thus, the Supreme Court overruled all of Alaska’s exceptions, holding that the United 
States had title to the land.1319 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. State, Department  of Natural Resources 
In ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. State, Department of Natural Resources,1320 the 
supreme court held that certain corporations were not entitled to a discovery royalty—a 
reduction of the rate of lease royalties owed to the State by oil companies that make the 
first commercial discovery of oil in a geographic structure.1321  ConocoPhillips was 
denied a special discovery royalty rate by the Commissioner of Natural Resources on the 
premise that the reservoir belonged to a known geographic structure.1322  The supreme 
                                                
1312 125 S.Ct. 2137 (2005). 
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court held that where an agency’s decision incorporates factual findings and is supported 
by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed.1323  The supreme court further held that 
procedural due process violations by the Commissioner were not significant enough to 
warrant reversal.1324  Thus, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s holding, 
finding that denial of discovery royalties was supported by substantial evidence and did 
not violate the lease or Alaska law.1325 
 
 
North Pacific Processors, Inc. v. City and Borough of Yakutat 
In North Pacific Processors, Inc. v. City and Borough of Yakutat,1326 the supreme 
court held that the trial court’s ruling that disputed items were “structural improvements 
and additions” was not clearly erroneous within the meaning of a lease.1327  The lessee, 
North Pacific Processors, Inc., added compressors and other equipment to a property for 
the operation of its fish processing plant.1328  After the lessee decided not to renew its 
lease, the lessor, City and Borough of Yakutat, sought injunctive and declaratory relief to 
prevent the lessee from removing the equipment, claiming that the lease contained a 
purchase option for these items.1329  The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s ruling 
that the disputed items were subject to the lease purchase option because they were 
“structural improvements and additions.”1330  However, the supreme court reversed the 
trial court’s ruling that the price of the equipment should be determined by the lessee’s 
internal depreciation schedule and remanded the case for proper valuation.1331   
 
 
Tufco v. Pacific Environmental Corp. 
In Tufco v. Pacific Environmental Corp.,1332 the supreme court held that a lessor 
was estopped from enforcing a hazardous waste provision, was required to pay costs and 
fees, and the lower court properly declined to amend the lessor’s complaint.1333  Tufco 
leased a building to Pacific Environmental Corp. (Penco).1334  The lease prohibited Penco 
from using the property to store hazardous materials.1335  While doing so, Fisher arranged 
and participated in a cleanup that required the storage of hazardous materials on the 
leased property.1336  Tufco later sued to evict Penco for storing the materials.1337  The 
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superior court concluded that Tufco was estopped from enforcing the provision given 
Fisher’s conduct.1338  Tufco moved to amend its complaint to include an allegation that 
the lease had been modified, but the court denied the motion and awarded Penco fees and 
costs.1339  Tufco appealed.1340  The supreme court held that the record supported a finding 
of estoppel because Fisher’s participation in the cleanup qualified as an “assertion” that 
Tufco would not enforce the hazardous materials provision, Penco reasonably relied on 
the assertion, this reliance resulted in prejudice, and justice required enforcement of the 
estoppel.1341  The supreme court held that the superior court properly declined to allow 
amendment of the complaint because the issue of modification had not actually been 
raised or litigated.1342  The supreme court also held that the lower court properly 
interpreted and applied the lease’s provision allowing prevailing-party costs and fees. 1343  
The fees award was proper because the lease’s provision should have been understood to 
include all attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing the contract, not just those incurred after 
the complaint was filed.1344  Similarly, the costs award was proper because the lease did 
not limit the recoverable costs to those incurred after the action was filed.1345  The 
supreme court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in holding that Tufco was 
estopped from enforcing the provision and required to pay costs and fees because the 
record supported a finding of equitable estoppel, the lower court properly declined to 
amend the complaint, and the costs and fees were proper under the terms of the lease.1346 
 
 
Cook Schuhmann & Groseclose v. Brown & Root 
In Cook Schuhmann & Groseclose v. Brown & Root,1347 the supreme court held 
that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale was fair and reasonable even when the trustee delayed 
the auction1348 and that an offer of judgment made before the parties exchange 
disclosures was not premature with respect to an award of attorneys’ fees.1349  Following 
default on a deed of trust, Brown & Root, the trustee, conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure 
sale of the property.1350  The auction was delayed four hours to allow two prospective 
bidders time to obtain the cash and certified checks required to bid.1351  After Cook filed 
suit claiming the sale procedures were not fair and reasonable, but before the parties had 
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made disclosures, Brown & Root served an offer of judgment that Cook rejected.1352  
Citing precedent that foreclosure sales will only be set aside as unfair or unreasonable in 
cases that reach unjust extremes,1353 the supreme court reasoned that Cook actually 
benefited from the delay in the auction because of the possibility of higher bids.1354  The 
supreme court held that the delay in the foreclosure sale was not unfair or 
unreasonable1355 and that an offer of judgment need not be made after disclosures to 
support an award of attorneys’ fees.1356 
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XVII.  TORT LAW 
 
 
Ninth Circuit  
 
Berg v. Popham 
In Berg v. Popham,1357 the Ninth Circuit held that a company who designed and 
installed equipment that led to the release of hazardous that could have arranger liability 
under Alaska’s strict liability for release of hazardous substance statute.1358  The Norge 
Corporation designed and installed dry cleaning equipment for Berg.1359  This equipment 
released hazardous substances, and Berg was strictly liable for its cleanup costs.1360  Berg 
sued Norge’s successor in interest for contribution.1361  After certifying questions with 
the Alaska Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that arranger liability requires “actual 
involvement” in a decision to dispose of waste.1362  The court further held, however, that 
under this approach a successor can be liable even if he does not own, have authority to 
control, or a duty to dispose of the hazardous waste, if it manufactures, sells or installs a 
useful product that is intended to direct a hazardous substance into a sewer system.1363  
Thus, there could be sufficient evidence to impose arranger liability against Norge.1364 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Berg v. Popham 
In Berg v. Popham,1365 the supreme court held that arranger liability could attach 
to a party that makes, sells, or installs a useful product that purposely directs hazardous 
substances into the environment even when the party does not own, possess, have 
authority to control, or have a duty to dispose of the hazardous substance.1366   Berg, a dry 
cleaner operator, was held liable for the release of a hazardous substance into the 
environment and sought contribution on an arranger liability theory from the franchising 
company that installed and leased the equipment that released the substance.1367  The 
supreme court held that the useful products exemption does not apply where the essential 
function of the product involves the release of a hazardous substance into the 
environment.1368  As a result, the supreme court held that arranger liability extends to a 
                                                
1357 412 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2005). 
1358 Id. at 1130. 
1359 Id. at 1125. 
1360 Id. 
1361 Id.  
1362 Id. at 1128–29. 
1363 Id. at 1127–29. 
1364 Id. at 1129. 
1365 113 P.3d 406 (Alaska 2005). 
1366 Id. at 605. 
1367 Id. at 606. 
1368 Id. at 611–12. 
 104 
party involved in the decision of the disposal method of hazardous substances, even if 
that party does not own, possess, have authority to control, or have a duty to dispose of 
the substance.1369   
 
 
Lowell v. Hayes 
 In Lowell v. Hayes,1370 the supreme court affirmed summary judgment of a claim 
of defamation, holding that there was no showing of actual malice, that a public figure 
could not obtain declaratory relief for defamation and that attorneys’ fees must be paid to 
the prevailing party because the final judgment was more favorable to the public figure 
than the initial settlement offer.1371  Lowell was a member of a committee formed to 
further the consolidation of the governments of a local borough and a city.1372  Lowell 
was accused by the city’s mayor, Hayes, of falsely purporting that he had followed 
inappropriate procedure in petitioning for a special election for consolidation.1373  The 
supreme court held that the statements were not based on actual malice because the 
dispute between Lowell and Hayes was based on a subjective interpretation of the 
procedural rules.1374  The supreme court also held that Lowell could not obtain 
declaratory relief because the law offers a public figure neither substantive nor 
declaratory relief to seek coercive remedies for non-malicious defamation.1375  Finally, 
the supreme court held that Lowell was required to compensate Hayes for attorneys’ fees 
because the final judgment was more favorable to Hayes than Lowell’s offer.1376  The 
supreme court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in all respects.1377 
 
 
Ondrusek v. Murphy 
In Ondrusek v. Murphy,1378 the supreme court held that the issue of respondeat 
superior liability was a question of fact for the jury.1379  Locke, a guide for Chilkoot 
Horseback Adventures (“Chilkoot”) took his parents, the Ondruseks, for a horseback ride 
on a day when Chilkoot was closed.1380  Locke’s mother was injured and sued Chilkoot 
under the theory of respondeat superior.1381  The Ondruseks filed for summary judgment, 
claiming that there was no issue of material fact regarding the respondeat superior 
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liability.1382  The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and the jury found 
for Chilkoot.1383  The supreme court affirmed the denial of summary judgment and held 
that the issue of respondeat superior liability was a question of material fact for the jury 
because there was an issue as to whether Locke acted within the scope of his 
employment.1384    
 
 
Guerrero v. Alaska Housing Finance Corp.  
In Guerrero v. Alaska Housing Financial Corp.,1385 the supreme court held that 
summary judgment was granted in error against the Department of Transportation and 
Public Facilities (“department”) because issues of material fact existed regarding whether 
the department negligently breached an operational duty to post no-crossing and advance-
warning signs at an intersection.1386  A five-year-old child was hit by a car and severely 
injured while crossing a street near the low-income housing development in which he 
lived.1387  His family sued the department for negligence in design, construction and 
maintenance of the intersection.1388  The supreme court held that under a qualified 
immunity exception, the department could be held liable for negligence arising out of 
operational decisions, which included the exercise of due care in ensuring proper 
roadway signage.1389  The court held that the Guerreros had established a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the department was negligent and as to whether the alleged 
negligence was the proximate cause of injury.1390  As such, the supreme court reversed 
the order granting summary judgment on the Guerreros’ negligent signing claim against 
the department and remanded the case for further proceedings.1391  The court affirmed the 
summary dismissal of all other claims.1392 
 
 
Jones v. State, Department of Corrections 
In Jones v. State, Department of Corrections,1393 the supreme court held that it 
was harmless error for the superior court to dismiss a claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (IIED) when the same damages were recovered on an alternative 
theory of wrongful termination1394 and that it was proper to deny recovery and award 
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attorneys’ fees when the jury award was less than a rejected settlement offer.1395  Jones 
received a memo containing racial and sexual slurs, informing him that he had been 
terminated as a prison barber.1396  Jones sued the state for IIED and wrongful 
termination.1397  The superior court dismissed Jones’s IIED claim on summary 
judgment.1398  Jones then refused a settlement offer and proceeded with his human rights 
act claim.1399  The jury found for Jones, but in an amount less than that of the settlement 
offer.1400  Thus, the superior court awarded costs and attorneys’ fees to the state.1401  On 
appeal, the supreme court affirmed and found that it was harmless error to dismiss the 
IIED claim because recovery for the same damages was won on the alternative claim of 
wrongful termination.1402  Further, the supreme court held that it was proper to deny 
recovery and award attorneys’ fees because Jones rejected a settlement offer for a higher 
amount.1403 
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XVIII.  TRUSTS AND ESTATES LAW 
 
 
Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Clement v. Fulton 
 In Clement v. Fulton,1404 the supreme court held that a lower court did not clearly 
err in rejecting an argument that a cancer patient would only have lived for one year if 
correctly diagnosed and allocating wrongful death proceeds accordingly.1405  Fulton died 
only days after a hospital failed to diagnose her with leukemia due to a blood test mix-
up.1406  Fulton’s children sued the hospital, which agreed to settle for $500,000.1407  
However, the parties could not agree on an allocation of the funds between Fulton’s 
children and husband.1408  The superior court allocated a disproportionate share of the 
settlement to Fulton’s husband based on his expected years of dependency on Fulton.1409  
On appeal, Fulton’s daughter, Clement, argued that the trial court erred in finding that 
Fulton had a life expectancy of more than one year based on unsworn medical reports.1410  
Based on independent review of the reports, the supreme court affirmed the allocation, 
holding that because the trial court did not clearly err in rejecting the assertion that Fulton 
would have only lived one year even if correctly diagnosed.1411 
 
 
In re Estate of Maldonado 
In In re Estate of Maldonado,1412 the supreme court held that a surviving spouse’s 
wrongful death proceeds should not be included in a decedent’s augmented estate.1413  
After the death of her husband, Maldonado sought to collect her elective share of her 
husband’s estate, but the superior court offset Maldonado’s elective share by the 
wrongful death settlement she received after her husband’s death.1414  The supreme court, 
however, ruled that the wrongful death proceeds are not property owned by the surviving 
spouse at the time of the decedent’s death.1415  Therefore, the supreme court reversed the 
superior court, holding that wrongful death proceeds should not offset a surviving 
spouse’s elective share.1416 
 
                                                
1404 110 P.3d 927 (Alaska 2005). 
1405 Id. at 929. 
1406 Id.at 928–29.  
1407 Id.at 929. 
1408 Id.  
1409 Id.  
1410 Id. at 930. 
1411 Id. at 929. 
1412 117 P.3d 720 (Alaska 2005). 
1413 Id. at 729. 
1414 Id. at 722. 
1415 Id. at 729. 
1416 Id. 
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Enders v. Parker 
In Enders v. Parker,1417 the supreme court held that a personal representative who 
sought to invalidate a decedent’s will was properly denied recovery of attorneys’ fees and 
costs from the estate because she had not acted in good faith.1418  Enders unsuccessfully 
challenged her stepfather’s will.1419  The superior court subsequently found Enders had 
not acted in good faith, and therefore denied the recovery of fees and costs from the 
estate.1420  Enders appealed.1421  The supreme court held that good faith required Enders 
to act in the best interests of the will’s successors, and a rebuttable presumption of good 
faith would have arisen if Enders had reasonably arguable grounds for her claim.1422  
However, the court held that surviving summary judgment did not establish that 
reasonably arguable grounds existed, as the proper inquiry was whether there was a 
reasonable chance of success at trial.1423  Further, the absence of sanctions against 
Ender’s attorney did not have any bearing on the finding of Ender’s lack of good faith.1424  
Moreover, it was within the discretion of the trial court to decide whether to hold an 
evidentiary hearing or accept additional evidence to determine whether Enders acted in 
good faith.1425  The supreme court affirmed the denial of fees and costs, holding that the 
superior court did not clearly err in finding a lack of good faith.1426 
 
                                                
1417 125 P.3d 1027 (Alaska 2005). 
1418 Id. at 1028. 
1419 Id.  
1420 Id. at 1029. 
1421 Id. 
1422 Id. at 1029–30. 
1423 Id. at 1032. 
1424 Id. at 1037. 
1425 Id. at 1037–38. 
1426 Id. at 1038. 
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